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Introduction 
 
Today, writing about the philosophy of economics is in many ways a difficult venture. 
It seems that these two disciplines have drifted away from each other during the last 
centuries. Philosophy has been dominated by the approaches of idealism, 
phenomenology, philosophy of language, and many other ways to look at the world that 
seem to have no ability to cover the questions arising in the science of economics. 
Economics, on the other hand, seems to have been captured fully by mathematics. If one 
is not able to construct complex models with many variables and integrals, one cannot 
understand nor explain what is going on in the economy. 
 
This was different in the past. Adam Smith, nowadays considered as one of the first 
economists, was in fact a moral philosopher. Even earlier in the medieval period the 
scholastics were concerned with questions of the just price, of markets, of the nature of 
money, and other economic concepts that were part of their debates on ethics and 
morality. We can go even further back to ancient Greece and find in the writings of 
these philosophers the very first questions on economics.1 
 
One of the best examples in the philosophy of ancient Greece is the story of Thales the 
Milesian that is discussed by Aristotle in his Politics2: 
There is the anecdote of Thales the Milesian and his financial device, which involves a 
principle of universal application, but is attributed to him on account of his reputation for 
wisdom. He was reproached for his poverty, which was supposed to show that philosophy 
was of no use. According to the story, he knew by his skill in the stars while it was yet 
winter that there would be a great harvest of olives in the coming year; so, having a little 
money, he gave deposits for the use of all the olive-presses in Chios and Miletus, which 
he hired at a low price because no one bid against him. When the harvest-time came, and 
many were wanted all at once and of a sudden, he let them out at any rate which he 
pleased, and made a quantity of money. (1259a8-18)3 
                                                 
1 cf. Joseph Schumpeter, Economic Method and Doctrin, New York 1954 and Jesús Huerta de Soto, Die 
Österreichische Schule der Nationalökonomie – Markt und unternehmerische Kreativität, Wien 2007 
2 Aristotle, Politics, Mineola 2000 
3 We use Bekker Numbers to indicate the passages in Aristotle’s writings. 
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In this simple and short story several topics of economics and particularly 
entrepreneurship are already addressed. First of all: what is the purpose of human action 
and are we really driven by utility maximization? Even if we discover a profit 
opportunity, we are not compelled to exploit it. But if we want to act in order to gain 
that profit we still need an ability of superior foresight just as Thales had special 
knowledge of the future harvest. Aristotle is not talking about the uncertainty of the 
future in this particular story.4 But what if Thales would have been wrong with his 
forecast? He would have suffered a loss. Thales’ mere ability of superior foresight is 
also not sufficient to characterize his venture as an entrepreneurial act.5 He has to carry 
out his opinion about the future and the plan to interfere in this future state of affairs. He 
has to have some money to pay the rent, he has to bargain and he has to set up a system 
of distribution for the presses. Aristotle portrays with this example an arbitrage-
entrepreneur6 who is only interested in using a difference in prices in order to gain 
profit. 
 
But let’s look at the situation from a slightly different angle. Again, Thales has the 
superior foresight that the olive harvest will be good this year. But let’s assume now 
that olive presses are not yet invented. Thales envisions a way that olives could be 
pressed much faster and in a much more efficient way than before. Due to his forecast, 
he estimates that there will be a need for this technology and he decides to use his 
money to by the raw materials he needs to produce the olive presses. At that time he 
probably has owned slaves that would help him to carry out his plan, but nowadays he 
would have to hire workers who would put together the machines under his managerial 
control. Again the summer comes and Thales is the only one who is providing olive 
presses. Again he can let them out at any rate he wants. But now there are even more 
uncertainties involved: (1) Is his forecast on the olive harvest correct? (2) Will he be 
                                                 
4 Aristotle proposes a physical concept of time that is made up of points of now. This might be a reason 
why this particularly human aspect of time, to perceive the future as uncertain, plays no role in his 
assessment of time. Cf. Aristotle, Physik, Hamburg 1987, Book IV Part 10-11 
5 We will talk about this later when we discuss the essence of entrepreneurship. We will see that, what 
Israel Kirzner calls ‘alertness’ which means the ability of superior foresight, is only one element of 
entrepreneurship. There are other components that are also important. 
6 This term relates to Kirzner’s picture of the entrepreneur. Joseph Schumpeter contrasts the arbitrage 
entrepreneur with the creative entrepreneur.  
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able to produce the presses he has envisioned? (3) How many of them shall be 
produced? (4) Will the farmers use his technology or will they reject it because it is too 
complicated, produces not the right quality or for other reasons? In the end, we face 
again the question of whether the profit he gained is just because he had a monopoly on 
market. But now this monopoly has contributed to some sort of social progress because 
more olives can be pressed in a more efficient way.7 
 
From this short story we can derive the main questions for this project: What is a human 
being? Why do human beings act? What is the essence of an entrepreneurial act? What 
role does the uncertainty of the future play in the regard to entrepreneurship? What is 
the most appropriate anthropological foundation for entrepreneurship? 
 
We will try to answer these questions by assessing some schools of thoughts and 
debates in the 20th century. Since these discussions are often an application of the 
fundamental questions that have been raised since the emergence of philosophy, we will 
also reflect on these debates with the terms and understanding of Aristotle’s 
philosophy.8 Of course there are some parts of his philosophy that are not appropriate 
for contemporary philosophy: slavery was abolished a long time ago, he had no concept 
of the human being as person (the individual was a substance), his idea of human action 
was limited to actions of citizens in the community and his concept of time was mainly 
physical and missed anthropological aspects. But as we will observe, his understanding 
of real things as composites of matter and form, his virtue-ethics, his concept of the 
human being as zoon politikon and his ideas of the relationship between potency and 
actuality will be very helpful in better understanding entrepreneurship in modern 
economic theory. 
 
We will start our investigation with a discipline of philosophy that is called 
Philosophical Anthropology. With the writings of Helmuth Plessner, Arnold Gehlen and 
                                                 
7 One might argue of course that invention of new technology also replaces human labor and thus is not 
contributing to social progress. We will not explore into depth the moral implication of technological 
progress and innovation. 
8 Among the economists we will discuss especially Carl Menger was heavily influenced by the 
philosophy of Aristotle and explicitly applied these philosophical concepts to his economic analysis. 
Since the economists that succeeded Menger somehow share the same worldview it will be valuable to 
reflect their arguments with an Aristotelian understanding. 
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Max Scheler we want to discuss “what a human being really is”. Aristotle stated that all 
human action is motivated by the quest for happiness (eudaimonia).9 (1095a14-20) This 
is valid for his concept of acts within the political community. With Philosophical 
Anthropology we will also discover other reasoning for the motivation of human action. 
 
Of particular interest, especially for economic and entrepreneurial action as we have 
seen in the little anecdote above, is the concept of uncertainty. We will explore four 
applications in philosophy where uncertainty is involved in different approaches to 
philosophy in order to gain an understanding how this principle is employed. We will 
start with skepticism in ancient Greek, we will look at Descartes’ to method of 
methodological doubt, and we want to understand for what reasons Kant talks about 
“the thing itself”. In ethics uncertainty was particularly addressed by John Rawls. He 
uses the concept of uncertainty as method to create the thought experiment of the ‘veil 
of ignorance’ in order to derive principles for justice. In economics, the importance of 
uncertainty has at least been widely discussed since Frank Knight’s Risk, Uncertainty 
and Profit. Uncertainty for Knight is linked to entrepreneurship. 
 
We then want to follow a debate on entrepreneurship and entrepreneurial acts during the 
20th century. Entrepreneurship was widely neglected in economic theory of the 20th 
century. Currently, entrepreneurship is taught in many schools and universities in its 
regard to business administration – how to become a successful entrepreneur, how to 
make decision under uncertainty, and many other topics are addressed. The role of 
entrepreneurship in the economy has not been addressed very thoroughly and a 
discussion of the essence of entrepreneurship from a philosophical perspective has been 
even more neglected. This investigation shall contribute the view of philosophy to 
entrepreneurship and employ an Aristotelian understanding to the concepts that are 
discussed. We can find again the metaphysical and ethical questions Aristotle tries to 
answer in the writings of Mises, Hayek, Kirzner, Salerno, and their contemporaries. 
Concepts such as alertness, ownership, and judgment are very similar to each other and 
try to emphasize different aspects that are part of the essence of entrepreneurship. 
Sometimes it is difficult to understand what separates these concepts and some of the 
                                                 
9 cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics, Sioux Falls 2009 
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terms face a problem found also in other philosophical disciplines: in the theoretical 
framework they have a different meaning (and sometimes mean the contrary) or have a 
different connotation than in everyday language. One of the best examples is the term 
profit. We usually associate with this term some kind of injustice, a surplus received by 
someone who does not deserve it. If someone gains profit, someone else has to suffer a 
loss. At least, it is unfair that some people have superior foresight (like Thales) and if 
they use this ability to make money this is generally perceived as not fair and selfish 
and they are obliged to give a larger share of what they have obtained back to society. 
 
In the debate about entrepreneurship we will look at, the term profit is generally 
employed for any incentive that motivates human action. We would not act if we would 
not expect profit. This is a pure psychic phenomenon which, as Mises expresses it, 
equals the reduction of uneasiness.10 Monetary reward, which is usually perceived as 
profit, is the response of the costumers how the entrepreneur has forecasted their future 
needs and carried out his plans to meet these needs and to reduce their uneasiness. In 
our investigation we use the terms like they have been employed by the authors and we 
will not consider any differences in everyday language. 
 
In our final assessment of the anthropological foundation of both economics and 
entrepreneurship, we will build upon the economists discussed before. The term 
methodological individualism has been used particularly to reject any kind of 
collectivist and central planning approach to economics. Since economics has been 
hijacked by mathematics and statistics11, the anthropological concept of methodological 
individualism has been somehow misleading. We will see that in today’s understanding, 
it is not the uniqueness of human action and the human person that is associated with 
methodological individualism but rather an understanding that man is rational, man can 
be grouped by certain properties and therefore we can forecast the future through a 
mathematical assessment of the economy. Modern economics, like modern science, 
entirely neglects the question, “what is it?” In other words, it reduces knowledge to 
what is makeable or producible. And so, only reproducible statistics have value – if we 
                                                 
10 Ludwig von Mises, Human Action: A Treatise on Economics, San Francisco 1996, p. 289 
11 like many other branches of modern sciences as well 
12 
follow a certain mathematical formula, we can predict the end results. This fails to 
acknowledge that economics is a “product” of humans and not the other way round.  
 
We will therefore argue for a concept that is called ‘economic personalism’. 
Personalism emerged as a philosophical and theological approach; its application to 
economics better supports arguments that were originally made by methodological 
individualism at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century. Personalism is 
rooted in the philosophy of Aristotle and has its foundation among other traditions in 
philosophical anthropology. The main principles are the uniqueness and dignity of the 
human person, the ability of self-determination and the expression of this ability 
through acting or not-acting, and the connectedness to other persons within a 
community. This will provide us with a sufficient anthropological basis for our 
understanding of entrepreneurship. 
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1. Philosophical Anthropology 
 
Anthropology is implicitly a discipline of philosophy since the beginning of philosophy 
in ancient Greek. The term anthropology [anthropos = human being, logos = science] 
was first used in the 16th century.12 Immanuel Kant was the first to distinguish 
anthropology from a physiological and a pragmatic perspective in 1789.13 The former is 
the field of medicine and ethnology; the latter describes the philosophical investigation 
of the nature of the human person. A tradition of a philosophical anthropology was not 
established until the beginning of the 20th century. The anthropological questions were 
always considered as subcategories of metaphysics, ethics and other disciplines of 
philosophy. 
 
According to Rowohlt’s Philosophielexikon, the reason for the late emergence of 
anthropology as a separate philosophical discipline can be found in the history of 
philosophy and its main topics. In ancient Greece, the concept of the cosmos dominated 
philosophy. The medieval theologians and philosophers were primarily concerned with 
God and the right place of man in God’s creation. With the Enlightenment man himself 
became the center of philosophical questions. But still, the philosophical approaches 
were dominated by epistemological and metaphysical discussions until, particularly in 
the German-speaking philosophy, the questions of being and reason were applied to a 
comprehensive theory of human nature. The three main philosophers in the 20th century 
dealing with this particular issue are: Helmuth Plessner, Max Scheler and Arnold 
Gehlen.14 
 
Within the metaphysical investigations, the analysis of human nature began in ancient 
Greece. Throughout the history of philosophy, many different concepts were proposed 
that oscillate between realism and idealism, between the primacy of nature and of form 
and between empiricism and rationalism. Philosophical anthropology starts its inquiry 
from the fact of a special ontological status of the human being in the world and is eager 
                                                 
12 cf. Anton Hügli/Paul Lübcke, Philosophielexikon, Reinbeck bei Hamburg 2005, p. 44 
13 cf. Immanuel Kant, Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht, Stuttgart 1983 
14 cf. Anton Hügli/Paul Lübcke, Philosophielexikon, Reinbeck bei Hamburg 2005, pp. 44 et seq. 
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to find the right approach to justify this fact. Before we go into depth, we want to give a 
short introduction to the main arguments of philosophical anthropology. 
 
For Helmuth Plessner, man is characterized through excentric positionality, which 
distinguishes him from animals (closed organic forms with central positionality) and 
plants (open organic forms). He states three fundamental anthropological laws. Natural 
artificiality describes the fact that man expresses himself in discovering the already 
existing reality and through this discovery process artificially transforms reality and 
creates culture. With the concepts of mediate immediacy and the utopian standpoint, 
Plessner tries to reconcile various anthropological concepts and wants to outline the 
limits of anthropology. 15 
 
Max Scheler who, like Plessner, was influenced by Edmund Husserl, talks about the 
person as the structural order of acts that are performed by the spirit. The spirit is the 
essential human ability to objectify things and is itself unbound from any kind of 
organic reality. His concept of man as an acting person rather than a substance is a 
crucial foundation for later developed concepts of personalism and will also serve as a 
philosophical foundation for our further investigation of human action in an economic 
environment.16 
 
Arnold Gehlen has similar conclusions like his fellow philosophical anthropologists. 
However, he chooses a different approach than Plessner and Scheler. He rejects the 
assumption that the organic world is built up in stages and that there is a highest level 
that includes all of the criteria below and is characterized by a particular concept such as 
excentricity or the spirit. For Gehlen, man is a Mängelwesen [deficient being] and his 
deficiencies urge him to act in order to survive. Customs are similar to the animal 
instincts and these customs become institutions in a culture that unburden man from the 
pressure of his instincts. Man, as an acting person, is able to postpone the satisfaction of 
his wants and this is the main reason why he is able to survive in this world although 
                                                 
15 cf. Helmuth Plessner, Die Stufen des Organischen und des Menschen. Einleitung in die Philosophische 
Anthropologie, Berlin 1965 
16 cf. Max Scheler, Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos, Bonn 1995 
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there is no particular sector of the world that is appointed to him by the wisdom of 
nature.17 
 
1.1 What is man? (Kant) 
As mentioned before, Immanuel Kant is the first philosopher who delivered a 
comprehensive discussion on human nature. In Logic he argues that philosophy can be 
separated in four different fields guided by four main questions: 1. What can I know? 2. 
What ought I to do? 3. What may I hope? 4. What is man? The first question is 
answered by metaphysics, the second by moral philosophy, the third by religion and the 
fourth by anthropology. But Kant also believes that the first three questions are all 
related to the last one and all philosophical inquiry is part of anthropology.18 
 
In Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, Kant distinguishes between 
physiological and pragmatic anthropology – the former is concerned with how nature 
shapes man, the latter with how man shapes himself as a free acting being. Kant’s 
anthropology contains different approaches of psychology and a chapter on the human 
character. His philosophical definition of human nature is that the human being is 
determined by his reason to be in society with other man and to cultivate, civilize and 
moralize himself through art and science.19 
 
Kant’s anthropology is more like a textbook of empirical psychology than a thorough 
philosophical discussion of human nature. This might be one of the reasons why 
anthropology in the following century was dominated by medicine and biology; it may 
also be the reason why philosophers were not particularly concerned with human nature 
and the special place of human beings in the world until the beginning of 20th century. 
 
1.2 Excentric Closed Organic Form (Plessner) 
Helmuth Plessner distinguishes in the Stages of the Organic World and Man living 
things from non-living things. A living thing is characterized by the boundary nature of 
its layer. A living thing also has border traffic in relation to its environment. The distinct 
                                                 
17 cf. Arnold Gehlen, Der Mensch. Seine Natur und seine Stellung in der Welt, Bonn 1955 
18 cf. Immanuel Kant, Logik, Königsberg 1800, p. 25 
19 cf. Immanuel Kant, Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht, Stuttgart 1983, A 324 
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setting of a living thing is positional. Within the organic forms there are three different 
stages. Plants have an open form – the organism is in all its expressions of life 
immediately embedded in its environment and is a dependent sector of its circle of life. 
Plants have no central organs. Animals are closed forms – the organism is mediated 
embedded in its environment and is an independent sector of its circle of life. Within the 
closed organic form, an antagonism between the organs has to be organized by a centre 
of the body. The body is the layer between the living thing and the medium. The body 
of the living being shares a border with the medium but has also gained a reality 
“behind” or “in” the body. The organism is therefore on a higher level of being.20 The 
animal is centrally organized, has a central positionality and cannot observe its own 
existence/being. 
 
The human living being stands in the center of existence, knows about this center and 
experiences it and is surpassing this center. The center of the positionality in the human 
being has to have a distance to it. This relationship is described by Plessner as total 
reflexivity. This relationship breaks a gap between the center and its experience – it 
removes the center of the self from the center of the body and with this excentricity the 
phenomena of inner field, outer field and consciousness follow. The inner field is the 
center of the experience, the outer field is the media that is bordering with the body and 
the consciousness is the excentric positionality of the human being where man becomes 
aware of his own existence. Man can experience himself as a person only if another 
person is present if he is in a Mitwelt [social environment]. The person is entwined with 
the contemporaries – the person bears its social environment and the social environment 
bears the person. Between persons is the sphere of the spirit. Spirit, soul and 
consciousness are different in the way that the soul is the real existence of the person, 
consciousness is the aspect in which the world is perceived through the excentricity of 
the personal existence and spirit is not a real existence but is the sphere that is created 
through this particular positionality and is realized in the social environment as long 
there is at least one other person existing.21 
 
                                                 
20 cf. Helmuth Plessner, Die Stufen des Organischen und des Menschen. Einleitung in die Philosophische 
Anthropologie, Berlin 1965, p. 231 
21 cf. Plessner, Die Stufen des Organischen und des Menschen, 1965, p. 303 
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Plessner describes three anthropological fundamental laws22: (1) natural artificiality, (2) 
mediated immediacy, and (3) the utopian standpoint. Man has lost his security through 
instincts through his freedom and is aware of this unreachable naturality of the other 
living forms. His natural existence is artificial. Due to his excentricity man is not in 
balance, he is without a specific place or time – he is genuinely homeless. His 
excentricity and the need to become something move man in the same direction – with 
all artificial means and his acts and tools he creates culture. Everything that becomes 
part of culture is in some way bound to the human author and at the same time 
independent from him. Human invention is in fact discovery. Man can only discover 
what already exists. Creativity is characterized by Plessner as a lucky snatch. The 
creative snatch is a form of human expression and is therefore artificial.23 
 
With the concept of mediated immediacy Plessner wants to reconcile idealist and realist 
concepts of epistemology. The excentric position of the human being causes immediate 
contact with reality and at the same time a mediated experience of the world from the 
excentric self-awareness and self-experience. The utopian standpoint expresses that it is 
not known to the human being from where it observes his own existence. This question 
is left to be answered by religion – man cannot answer this by himself. Religion reveals 
the order to the human being thus giving him a home.24 
 
 
1.3 The Person as the Structural Order of Acts (Scheler) 
Max Scheler was a student of Edmund Husserl. Influenced by his teacher’s approach of 
phenomenology, he developes philosophical anthropology as a particular concept that 
should explain the Sonderrolle [special role] of man in the world. In his last book Man’s 
Place in the Cosmos he writes about the relationship of Geist [mind/spirit] and Leben 
[living being]. He believes that man is neither a part of a hierarchy of the living world 
nor is he primarily dominated by the spirit. Man has a soul (the psychological aspect of 
the living being) and a body (the physiological aspect of the living being). But the X25 
                                                 
22 cf. Plessner, Die Stufen des Organischen und des Menschen, 1965, pp. 288 et seqq. 
23 cf. Plessner, Die Stufen des Organischen und des Menschen, 1965, pp. 309 et seqq. 
24 cf. Plessner, Die Stufen des Organischen und des Menschen, 1965, pp. 341 et seqq. 
25 Scheler uses the term “X” when he refers to the human spirit 
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that is aware of the unity of body and soul surpasses at the same time this unity and is 
not part of this world. The spirit is surpassing space and time and is pure actuality. The 
structural order of these acts is the person.26 
 
The person and the spirit are not objects and cannot be seen as objects. The spirit by 
acting is not discovering the objective reality but is co-creating it. Scheler calls this the 
Akt der Ideierung [act of the spirit in the world]. This act is fundamentally different 
from all kinds of forms of intelligence or reasoning, it is the recognition of the essence 
of things and the world itself. It is not only being conscious but it is consciousness of 
being conscious. For Scheler, there exists a structural unity of consciousness of the 
world and of the self (and also of God).27 
 
Scheler elaborates his concept of the living being in order to overcome the 
misconceptions of the past that either described man as rational animal or on the other 
hand described the non-human world with mechanic concepts. For Scheler there are 
four different aspects of the living being:28 (1) the urge to feel, which is shared by all 
living entities; (2) instinct, which is shared by animals and human beings and is 
basically oriented towards life – it is a kind of fixed rhythm of reaction to the world; (3) 
associative memory, which can be gained and exercised and is present in animals 
related to the characteristic of conditional reflexes; and (4) Scheler believes that there 
are some acts of animals that can be considered as influenced by organically bound 
practical intelligence. Nevertheless this form of intelligence is genuinely an aspect of 
the nature of the human living being. 
 
Of course all of these aspects are part of the human nature as well. But the spirit that is 
crucial for human beings is existentially unbound from the organic reality and is 
therefore open to the world and free from the environment. Animals experience their 
environment and Scheler argues that they also experience some sort of resistance that is 
originated there. They can react to this resistance but they are bound to their 
environment. Only human beings have a capacity to negate this resistance and therefore 
                                                 
26 cf. Max Scheler, Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos, Bonn 1995, p. 48 
27 cf. Scheler, Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos, 1995, p. 89 
28 cf. Scheler, Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos, 1995, pp. 16 et seqq. 
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objectify29 the things in the world as things and at the same time objectify the world as 
such. Scheler introduces three key concepts for man’s nature: Neinsagenkönner [he who 
can say no], Weltoffenheit [openness to the world] and the ability to objectify the 
environment. The ability of negating the resistance of the environment adds an 
additional level of reflection to the form of consciousness of animals. Only the human 
being has the full established Ding- und Substanzkategorie [category of thing and 
substance].30 
 
1.4 Deficient Being (Gehlen) 
Arnold Gehlen published his main work Man, his nature and place in the world on 
philosophical anthropology in 1940. He has been influenced among others by Max 
Scheler. He employs phrases such as ‘openness to the world’ that have been coined by 
Scheler before but he develops a fundamentally different approach to justify the special 
role of the human being in nature. Gehlen rejects the notion of stages of the living world 
as it is described by Aristotles or Scheler. He undertakes a biological argumentation for 
the differentiation between animals and human beings. 
 
Animals are equipped with morphological elements, dynamism and drive to deal with 
the environmental demands. Within their space of life they couple instinctively 
perceptions and patterns of movement. Their circle of functions is a rhythmical 
circulation. In human beings this instinctive behavior is reduced and not applied to a 
particular Ausschnitts-Milieu [sector milieu]. Man is not specialized in any specific way 
and is therefore determined mainly by deficiencies (he is not covered with hair that 
would protect him against weather, has no means to attack an enemy and also no ability 
to escape quickly). There is no single characteristic that distinguishes man from the rest 
of the living world (like Scheler’s spirit or Aristotle’s rational part of the soul). 
Therefore man is genuinely a Mängelwesen [deficient being].31  
 
                                                 
29 By the term ‘objectify’ Scheler means that man has the capacity to experience himself as the subject 
and the relationship he has to objects like other things and the world as such. 
30 cf. Scheler, Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos, 1995, p. 44 
31 cf. Arnold Gehlen, Der Mensch. Seine Natur und seine Stellung in der Welt, Bonn 1955, p. 35 
20 
Man is open to the world and at the same time burdened with the pressure of his 
instincts and stimulus satiation. This burden urges man to act and to unburden himself 
by transforming the existing reality into something that is lebensdienlich [useful for his 
life]. Man is not a natural being but always a cultural being. Man could not survive in 
nature but always has to transform it into culture (starting with the simplest acts such as 
creating clothes, using weapons or making fire). Hence, animals are surrounded by 
environment, man is surrounded by culture. Culture is man’s second nature.32 
 
Man is exposed to an undirected complexity of external stimuli and internal drives, he 
finds himself in a natural co-dependency of dynamic relationship between perception 
and behavior, between inside and outside. This relationship is entsichert [made 
unsecure] and is a burden for human beings. Therefore man wants to secure this 
relationship by action. Because man is unfertig [unfinished] and has no particular sector 
in this world that the higher wisdom of nature has provided for him, where his instincts 
naturally meet the environmental demands, man has to act in order to survive. Man’s 
only means to balance his deficiencies is action. Gehlen describes man as an acting 
being. Action unburdens man from the pressure of instincts. Man has the ability to 
restrain drives and needs and postpone them in order to fulfill them at a later point in 
time. Man creates a hiatus. The hiatus is the emptiness between drive and fulfillment. It 
is one of the essential characteristics of human action. Man has to plan his work because 
he always has to secure what he needs and it is never already provided for him. 
Therefore he must restrain his drives and act now according to his forecasting of what 
he will need for his existence in the future.33 
 
This process of Entlastung [unburdening] is an essential anthropological category 
according to Gehlen. Unburdening can be gained especially through Gewohnheit 
[customs]. Customs in culture resemble instincts in nature. Customs are quasi-
instinctive behavior of human beings. These customs result in a concept that Gehlen 
calls institutions. His concept of institutions is very broad. Institutions can be 
technology (tools, etc.), language and rituals, but also the state, church and other terms 
that characterize the peculiar nature of social relations among human living beings. 
                                                 
32 cf. Gehlen, Der Mensch. Seine Natur und seine Stellung in der Welt, 1955, p. 40 
33 cf. Gehlen, Der Mensch. Seine Natur und seine Stellung in der Welt, 1955, p. 361 
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Upon summation we can see that Gehlen also defends a concept of the acting human 
being that is driven by man’s deficiencies. In his concept of culture he is mainly 
concerned with the basic needs of human beings for their existence but this fundamental 
culturality of human beings is an interesting point to think through further when it 
comes to institutions such as the market, money or other customs that enable man to 
balance his deficiencies even better than he would be able by transforming nature by 
himself. 
 
1.5 Economic Actions 
Philosophical anthropology equips us with three arguments regarding human nature that 
will be the basis for our further investigation: (1) action is a particular human category 
and essential for human nature and the concept of the person; (2) man is a deficient 
being and is urged to act in order to survive; and (3) man’s actions transform the natural 
reality and create an artificial culture. 
 
In the next chapters we want to explore how the concept of human action can be applied 
to an environment of scarce resources. We want to build our arguments on the 
assumption that man is always urged to act because he is a deficient being and always 
has needs. This urgency to action is not limited to the satisfaction of needs in order to 
survive but this is a fundamental category of human nature and motivates human action. 
Furthermore, needs do not determine actions – man is free and has the ability to say no 
and to postpone the fulfillment of his needs (and drives) or to neglect their fulfillment 
all together. 
 
The urgency to action and the freedom to postpone and neglect needs are essential 
feature of human nature especially in the reality of an economic environment. We want 
to see how economists describe Akte der Ideierung and which arguments are employed 
to consider them either as co-creation or as discovery of an already existing reality. 
Entrepreneurship is action that is genuinely transforming nature, combining resources 
and creating artificial things and services that do not naturally exist. We will argue that 
entrepreneurship also involves the employment of capital and some sort of ownership 
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and hence we will also see that the ability to postpone consumption (the fulfillment of 
needs in an economy) is a crucial prerequisite for entrepreneurship. 
 
But man is motivated to act not only by his physiological deficiencies but also by his 
ontological deficiencies. Man is aware of his existence but existence does not only 
involve locality but also temporality (as we can already see in the fact that 
postponement involves time). We will argue that the future is ontologically different 
from the past and the present.34 The genuine uncertainty of the future also motivates 
human beings to act. If the future would be certain, there would be no necessity to freely 
perform actions but humans would react mechanically to the already predetermined 
future events. Uncertainty in the human sphere cannot be reduced but can be borne 
through leadership. 
 
The concept of uncertainty has been an implicit issue throughout the history of 
philosophy. In the next chapter we want to reflect briefly on some of the implications of 
uncertainty on philosophical concepts before we apply uncertainty to the sphere of 
economics. This will lay the foundation for the following assessment of 
entrepreneurship and how it is related to uncertainty.  
 
                                                 
34 The difference in the ontological status of future, past and present can be understood from an 
anthropological perspective. The past consist of facts and experiences that can be remembered. The future 
is fundamentally uncertain and motivates human action. The present is where human acts are located that 
are performed by the individual in order to react to the uncertainty of the future informed by the facts and 
experiences of the past. 
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2. Uncertainty 
 
In this investigation into the nature and history of uncertainty we want to distinguish the 
term uncertainty from risk in the same way like Frank Knight.35 Both concepts describe 
a relationship of the human person to the future of objective reality of the world. The 
human person is ignorant about the future. There is no way to have certainty about what 
is going to happen. But the human person wants to deal with his ignorance. If there is a 
way to forecast the future on a measureable, quantitative basis then we will use the term 
risk. If this future is immeasurable and fundamentally non-quantitative we will speak of 
uncertainty. 
 
Before we look at the implications of uncertainty in economics we want to explore 
some concepts in the history of philosophy that dealt in different ways with principles 
of uncertainty or ignorance. This will provide us with a better understanding of how 
these principles are employed to argue various philosophical concepts. We will also see 
that uncertainty is used in economics e.g. to justify profit as legitimate residual income 
from entrepreneurial action or to reject any sort of central planning. 
 
In the history of philosophy we will investigate four different approaches and ways of 
involving some sort of uncertainty in a philosophical theory. These examples shall show 
how philosophers use uncertainty to develop their metaphysical, anthropological or 
ethical arguments. Skepticists rejects any form of judgment and systematic theory 
because in their opinion certain truth criteria do not exist. But their ultimate goal is not 
the disproval of the validity of any other theory but they are pursuing the peace of the 
soul.36 Uncertainty about sensorial experience leads Descartes to formulate his principle 
of methodological doubt and the conclusion, that the only certain principle in the world 
is the cogito.37 The uncertainty, if our sensory experience may be able to correspond 
                                                 
35 cf. Frank H. Knight, Risk, Uncertainty and Profit, Mineola/New York 2006, p. 31 
36 cf. Anton Hügli, Paul Lübcke, Philosophielexikon, Reinbeck bei Hamburg 2005, p. 581 
37 cf. René Descartes, “Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting the Reason“, in: Great Books of 
the Western World. Desartes, Spinoza. Chicago, London, et al. 1984 
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with the world, was urging Kant to coin the terms of phenomena and noumena.38 In 
modern political philosophy John Rawls employed the principle of uncertainty in his 
theory of justice in a methodological way. 39 
 
The concept of uncertainty plays an important role in a particular strand of modern 
economic theory that we want to investigate in depth and use as a foundation for the 
following assessment of entrepreneurial theories. Frank Knight differentiated in 1921 
between uncertainty and risk and related these concepts to entrepreneurship.40 Ludwig 
v. Mises elaborated more on the intimate relationship between uncertainty and human 
action in an economic environment41 and Friedrich A. v. Hayek concentrated his 
arguments on the dispersion of knowledge and the epistemic sphere of uncertainty.42 
 
2.1 Philosophy 
One philosophical approach uses uncertainty as guiding principle: Skepticism doubts 
that one could know anything with certainty. Skeptics believe that there are no criteria 
that could prove an assertion true. Pyrrhon from Elis was the first in ancient philosophy 
to systematically doubt all kinds of objective truth. He rejected to make judgments. He 
believed that things were not perceivable how they really are. For Pyrrhon, these 
insights are a prerequisite for happiness. In order to achieve happiness and peace for the 
soul (ataraxia) he developed skepticism as a method and an attitude towards live. The 
skeptics in ancient Greece criticized other approaches to philosophy (particularly 
stoicism) as dogmatic.43 Hence, for the early skeptics the uncertainty about the existence 
of truth-criteria in the world provided a basis particularly for ethical implications and 
for a concept of how to live their lives. Skeptics deal with uncertainty in the way that 
they don’t want to be troubled by uncertainty and therefore don’t judge and develop any 
kind of teaching. 
 
                                                 
38 cf. Immanuel Kant, “Critique of Pure Reason” in: Great Books of the Western World. Kant. Chicago, 
London, et al. 1984 
39 cf. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Cambridge 1971 
40 cf. Frank H. Knight, Risk, Uncertainty and Profit, Mineola/New York 2006 
41 cf. Ludwig von Mises, Human Action: A Treatise on Economics, San Francisco 1996 
42 cf. Friedrich A. Hayek, “The Use of Knowledge in Society”, in The American Economic Review 1945 
43 cf. Anton Hügli, Paul Lübcke, Philosophielexikon, Reinbeck bei Hamburg 2005, p. 581 
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René Descartes is concerned with the fact that opinions are uncertain to some degree 
and sensory experience is often times erroneous. Thus, he wants to find a ground of 
absolute certainty as a first principle for philosophy and uses the concept of doubt as a 
method. In Discourse on Method Descartes writes: “I thought that it was necessary for 
me […] to reject as absolutely false everything as to which I could imagine the least 
ground of doubt, in order to see if afterwards there remained anything in my belief that 
was entirely certain.”44 Since all thoughts and conceptions that human beings have 
while they are awake can also be part of their dreams, Descartes decides to treat 
everything that enters the human mind as no more true than the illusions of dreams. He 
doubtes anything that we perceive or think. And then he concludes that the only ground 
he cannot doubt while he is doubting is the “I” that is doubting: 
[Whilst] I thus wished to think all things false, it was absolutely essential that the “I” who 
thought this should be somewhat, and remarking that this truth “I think, therefore I am” 
was so certain and so assured that all the most extravagant suppositions brought forward 
by the skeptics were incapable of shaking it.45 
 
For Descartes the ground of certainty in the world is the res cogitans, the thinking 
substance, a substance that is totally distinct from the body. This kind of dualism is the 
metaphysical and anthropological implication that can be derived, according to 
Descartes, from the fact that perceptions and thoughts of the world are uncertain and 
have to be doubted in order to develop the first principle of philosophy. 
 
Kant’s approach to deal with the uncertainties in the world is different from Descartes’. 
With the question, “What can I know?”46, he sets out in the Critique of Pure Reason to 
explore the limits of human sensual experience and human understanding. We cannot 
know how things in themselves, the noumena, are. But this uncertainty is not a fact that 
can be removed by collecting new data about the thing in itself, but it is a fundamental 
reality of reason and has a limitative implication on human sensibility. We can only deal 
with the phenomena, with the perception of how things appear.  
                                                 
44 Descartes, “Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting the Reason”, 1984, p. 51 
45Descartes, “Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting the Reason”, 1984, p. 51 [italics in 
original] 
46 Kant, “Critique of Pure Reason”, 1984, p. 236 
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The conception of noumenon, that is, of a thing which must be cogitated not as an object 
of sense, but as a thing in itself (solely through the pure understanding) […] is necessary 
to restrain sensuous intuition within the bounds of phenomena and thus to limit the 
objective validity of sensuous cognition.47 
 
By applying this confinement to human perception, the human understanding is limiting 
itself. This is a fundamental principle in the philosophy of Kant: Man draws the lines 
between what he is able to know with some sort of certainty and what is just a mere 
form of thought. Kant rejects the interpretation that the concept of noumena is dividing 
the world into a mundus sensibilis and intelligibilis and that noumena are particular 
intelligible objects of our understanding. Kant calls this conception problematic because 
it contains no contradiction in itself. Thus for Kant, we possess an understanding that is 
extending problematically beyond the sphere of phenomena and the sensual uncertainty 
about the thing in itself limits human intuition. The concept of noumena limits the 
objective validity of sensible knowledge.48 
 
John Rawls was one of the few philosophers who employed the principle of uncertainty 
explicitly in his ethics and political theory.49 In Theory of Justice he describes the 
concept of the veil of ignorance, a pure thought experiment of a situation where 
everybody would be absolutely uncertain about his future position in society. He 
employs the uncertainty of the future (no one can forecast with any certainty his future 
position in society) as a methodological principle: “I assume that the parties are situated 
behind a veil of ignorance. They do not know how the various alternatives will affect 
their own particular case and they are obliged to evaluate principles solely on the basis 
of general considerations.”50 From this situation he derives two principles of justice51 on 
                                                 
47 Kant, “Critique of Pure Reason”, 1984, p. 97 
48 cf. Kant, “Critique of Pure Reason”, 1984, p. 97 et seq. 
49 Rawls generally uses the term “ignorance” to describe the situation of what he calls “original position” 
where everybody has no knowledge - is fundamentally uncertain - about his individual situation in the 
future. We can look at ignorance and uncertainty as two sides of the same coin. Ignorance is related to the 
status of knowledge about the future of the individual, uncertainty is related to the objective world with 
space and time.   
50 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 1971, pp. 136 et seq. 
51 Even though it doesn’t contribute to the understanding of uncertainty, the two principles of justice shall 
be mentioned here (Rawls, Theory of Justice, 1971, p. 302): (1) Each person is to have an equal right to 
the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all. 
(2) Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both: (a) to the greatest benefit of 
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which, he argues, everybody could agree from the perspective of the original position.52 
Rawls wants to develop principles of public justice that can effectively regulate a 
society. He uses the veil of ignorance to exclude any form of self-interest from his 
reasoning and to create a theoretical situation that enables us to find out some 
fundamental principles. Rawls uses uncertainty exclusively in a methodological way. 
For his further assessment there is no further consideration what role uncertainty plays 
for the individual in the society regulated by principles of justice. 
 
 
2.2 Economics 
One of the first economists addressing the issue of uncertainty in the economic world 
was Richard Cantillon53. In his Essai sur la Nature du Commerce en Général published 
in 1755 he describes how undertakers (his word for entrepreneurs) buy from the 
producers a certain price and sell it to their customers at an uncertain price. This 
uncertainty justifies the profit they gain through the price difference. But also 
undertakers, who take charge of mines or buildings and also undertakers that live of 
their own capital and need no labor, live at uncertainty. Besides the landowners and the 
nobles Cantillon distinguishes two classes of people: undertakers and hired people. 
Undertakers live at uncertain wages, others at fixed wages.54 
 
Knight 
In the sphere of economics the term uncertainty is ultimately connected with the name 
Frank Knight. He was the first economist to explicitly develop a comprehensive theory 
of uncertainty that is linked to profit and entrepreneurial activity. In his master piece 
Risk, Uncertainty and Profit in 1921 he starts an assessment of different theories of 
profit, especially those related to risk. He examines the theories of German, French and 
British economists in the 19th century. According to Knight, the German ones generally 
believe that profit is a residual income. However, they are more concerned with the 
                                                                                                                                               
the least advantaged, consistent with the just savings principle, and (b) attached to offices and positions 
open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity. 
52 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 1971, pp. 60 et seqq. 
53 cf. Jesús Huerta de Soto, Die Österreichische Schule der Nationalökonomie – Markt und 
unternehmerische Kreativität, Wien 2007, p. 51 
54 cf. Richard Cantillon, Essai sur la Nature du Commerce en General, London. 1959, Part I Chapter XIII 
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social justification of profit in their debate with German socialists. The French tend to 
consider profit as a form of wage and the English view is classifying profit as a return 
on capital. 
 
Knight builds his own concept on two theories developed at the beginning of the 20th 
century, the “dynamic theory” of J.B. Clark and the “risk theory” of F.B. Harley.55 
Professor Clark distinguishes between a static and a dynamic state of the economy. The 
static state is the state of natural adjustment, where change is absent and no profits 
besides wages for supervision exist. The dynamic state is differing because change 
exists. Dynamic change produces temporary profits that through competition could be 
annihilated again. Knight criticizes the missing distinction of foreseen change and 
unforeseen change. The relation between change and profit is always indirect – change 
can only create a situation in favor of profit, if it brings about ignorance of the future but 
it is not the reason for profit. 
 
But Uncertainty must be taken in a sense radically distinct from the familiar notion of 
Risk, from which it has never been properly separated. The term "risk," as loosely used in 
everyday speech and in economic discussion, really covers two things, which, 
functionally at least, in their causal relations to the phenomena of economic organization, 
are categorically different. […] The essential fact is that "risk" means in some cases a 
quantity susceptible of measurement, while at other times it is something distinctly not of 
this character; and there are far-reaching and crucial differences in the bearings of the 
phenomenon depending on which of the two is really present and operating. […] It will 
appear that a measurable uncertainty, or "risk" proper, as we shall use the term, is so far 
different from an unmeasurable one that it is not in effect an uncertainty at all. We shall 
accordingly restrict the term "uncertainty" to cases of the non-quantitive type. It is this 
"true" uncertainty, and not risk, as has been argued, which forms the basis of a valid 
theory of profit and accounts for the divergence between actual and theoretical 
competition.56 
 
As we shall see later, Knight also assesses the existence and different forms of 
probabilities. This is important especially for how man deals with risk and uncertainty. 
                                                 
55 cf. Knight, Risk, Uncertainty and Profit, 2006, p. 31 
56 Knight, Risk, Uncertainty and Profit, 2006, p. 19 
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Risk can be measured through grouping instances of a single class and thus calculating 
a probability that might be regarded to as being “somehow objective.” Uncertainty on 
the other hand would be paralyzing, if it would be addressed in the same way like risk. 
Apparently, even if it was objectively impossible and there was no quantitative 
probability, man has the tendency to form classes of cases and group individual 
decisions. According to Knight, we then talk about judgment. Judgment is the 
anticipation of an uncertain future. An important role for the subjective part of 
uncertainty that is experienced by the judging person is also the nature of his character. 
The higher the confidence in his estimation, the lower is the subjective uncertainty. 
 
Mises 
Ludwig v. Mises dedicates a whole chapter of his opus magnus Human Action to the 
examination of uncertainty. For him, uncertainty and human actions are two sides of the 
same coin. The uncertainty of the future is the reason for human action. “If man knew 
the future, he would not have to choose and would not act. He would be like an 
automaton, reacting to stimuli without any will of his own.”57 For Mises, the fact that 
the future cannot be known, opens the room for human self-determination. He calls the 
science dealing with human action praxeology58. 
 
According to Mises, natural sciences have the ability to foretell results obtained by 
definite actions except in two unpredictable spheres: insufficiently known natural 
phenomena and human acts of choice. He admits that natural sciences, such as physics 
and chemistry, deal with theorems of extremely high probability in order to be called 
certain for practical reasons. But this contains no practical importance to praxeology.  
If we look at the individual level of an entrepreneur who produces industrial goods, we 
can observe that he might be able to scientifically forecast the working of a machine. 
But this is only part of the whole process of producing a good to satisfy the consumer’s 
wants. There is no scientific method to find out the future desires of costumers and the 
best ways to meet their expectations. This will always belong to the field of speculation 
that has to be carried out by human action. The entrepreneur has to forecast these future-
                                                 
57 Ludwig von Mises, Human Action: A Treatise on Economics, San Francisco 1996, p. 105 
58 derived from the Greek words for human action (praxis) and the Greek word for science (logos). 
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wants and decides on the quality and quantity of a good that he wants to produce. And 
then he designs the machine that shall enable him to do so. 
 
The primary problem of praxeology is that of probability. Mises condemns the strong 
influence of mathematics in probability. He distinguishes (1) class probability and (2) 
case probability.59 With class probability he describes the fact that we know everything 
about the behavior of a class of events but nothing about the individual, singular event 
besides that this event is part of the class (lottery or dice game). Our knowledge about 
the singular event is incomplete and at the same time cannot be completed. Mises points 
out that a translation into mathematical language does not change anything about the 
knowledge we already had beforehand. Also, insurance has nothing to do with taking on 
the risk of a certain singular event to happen – this would be mere gambling and a 
substitution for the existing risk. Insurance may be rather understood as a pooling of 
risk, where an insurer can assess the probability of a whole class of events and therefore 
calculate the risk of the occurrence of one event, even though he does not know which 
particular client will eventually suffer the loss. There is also no uncertainty for the 
organizer of a lottery (given that the tickets are sold) that he will lose money with his 
business. 
 
Case probability is entirely different from class probability except for the principle of 
the incompleteness of knowledge. In case probability, we know some of the facts that 
determine the specific outcome of a particular event and also other factors we do not 
know. In case probability it makes no sense to refer to any kind of frequency because 
we deal with unique events that are not members of a specific class. Mises illustrates the 
concept with what he calls the “gambler’s fallacy”. This refers to a misconception, e.g. 
when a doctor tells a patient that from a particular surgery 30 out of 100 are dying and 
the patient is thus asking him, if the maximum number of deaths had already been 
reached. Case probability is therefore a feature particularly dealing with human action 
rather than with classes of events or data. 
 
                                                 
59 cf. von Mises, Human Action: A Treatise on Economics, 1996, pp. 107 et seqq. 
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Mises distinguishes three different modes for dealing with the future60: (1) gambling, 
(2) engineering and (3) speculating. The gambler only knows a certain frequency of 
outcomes of events. This knowledge is useless for the undertaking. He trusts only in his 
good luck. The engineer knows everything necessary he needs to know in order to 
technically solve a problem. The fringes of uncertainty he tries to eliminate by taking 
safety margins. His operating principle is to act in an orbit of certainty. Man in general 
is a speculator due to his need for adjusting to other people’s actions. His success 
depends on his ability to forecast the future.  
 
To explain how men interact with each other with regard to uncertainty, Mises uses 
three different terms to explain their behavior. (1) Betting describes the act of risking to 
lose or win money against another man over the outcome of an event, of which we only 
have partial knowledge. (2) Gambling means risking money without having any 
knowledge of the actual outcome. (3) Playing Games is used for situations where one 
partner has to be defeated by the other according to the rules of the game. Though 
playing a game can be considered as human action, Mises denies any analogy to the 
conduct of business. “The card player wins money by outsmarting his antagonist. The 
businessman makes money by supplying customers with goods they want to acquire.”61 
Business based on a right order is serving the members of society – as soon as there is 
antagonization, social disintegration follows. 
 
Mises points out that the only appropriate method to deal with the uncertainty of the 
future is understanding62. By the law of supply-and-demand we can predict that the 
price for something will drop if the demand goes down. But we can estimate the extent 
only by the method of understanding.  
 
Hayek 
In his assessment of knowledge, Friedrich Hayek is not explicitly dealing with the 
problem of uncertainty. But his contribution concerning the dispersion of knowledge 
                                                 
60 cf. von Mises, Human Action: A Treatise on Economics, 1996, pp. 112 et seqq. 
61 von Mises, Human Action: A Treatise on Economics, 1996, p. 116 
62 Mises discusses understanding as a task for the historian who assesses the value judgments and the ends 
people pursued in the past. But since everybody is observing the conditions of his environment, for 
Mises, everybody is a historian and has to use the method of understanding. 
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over time and place is important for our examination. The so called Hayekian 
Knowledge Problem63 is being discussed in his famous 1945 paper, The Use of 
Knowledge in Society.  
 
Hayek analyzes the problem of economic calculus and points out that “data” necessary 
for starting economic calculus, is never a given thing for the whole of society. We 
therefore rather face “the problem of utilization of knowledge not given to anyone in its 
totality”64. But the question is, who can plan the most efficient use of scarce resources 
and how should this plan be put into reality. It is a fact that all economic activity 
somehow involves planning. However, the question that Hayek explores is: Who does 
the planning? He distinguishes between planning done centrally, competition that 
implies decentralized planning, and planning in organized industries, which denotes a 
monopoly. 
 
Hayek distinguishes between65 (1) scientific knowledge – a form of objective 
knowledge on which basis a rational decision for the planning of society may be taken 
and (2) the knowledge of the particular time and circumstances – unorganized 
knowledge that gives every individual some sort of advantage over all others, because 
he possesses unique information that can be only put to use, if the decision is left to 
him. For Hayek, this is especially important, due to the fact that economic problems 
always arise in consequence of change. Hayek points out that change not only is a 
matter of long-term decisions, such as erecting a new plant. It is also the adapting to 
ever-changing circumstances in business life requiring particular knowledge being 
applied by the individual. 
 
Hayek accuses the economists of his time of neglecting the role of the small changes in 
business life. He believes that one contributor to this development is the preoccupation 
of statistical aggregates that are suggesting more stability. The specific knowledge 
Hayek is concerned with, cannot be conveyed in statistical form. As a solution he 
                                                 
63 cf. Frédéric Sautet, An Entrepreneurial Theory of the Firm, London/New York: 2000, et al. 
64 Friedrich A. Hayek, “The Use of Knowledge in Society”, in The American Economic Review 1945, p. 
520 
65 Hayek, “The Use of Knowledge in Society”, 1945, p. 521 
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suggests a form of decentralization to leave the decision to the people who are familiar 
with the particular circumstances. It is not necessary that they have the total knowledge 
of the causes for the change in circumstances. They only need to know how much more 
or less difficult it is for them to obtain things due to these changes that have taken place 
earlier. This problem is solved by the price system. “Fundamentally, in a system where 
the knowledge of the relevant facts is dispersed among the people, prices can act to 
coordinate the separate actions of different people in the same way as subjective values 
help the individual to coordinate the parts of his plan.”66 
 
To the three principles derived from philosophical anthropology (action as a distinct 
human category, man as a deficient being and the transformation of nature by man) we 
can add now the following principles from our investigation of uncertainty: (1) 
uncertainty motivates human action and humans act in order to reduce uneasiness, (2) 
knowledge is dispersed among people and is best applied by acts of the individual, (3) 
to bear the uncertainty of the future man has to make judgment, believe in them and 
carry them out. With this set of principles as a basis we will now proceed with our 
assessment of the nature of entrepreneurial action in the economy. 
 
 
                                                 
66 Hayek, “The Use of Knowledge in Society”, 1945, p. 526 
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3. The Entrepreneur in Economic Theory 
 
In recent years, a strong increase in the interest for entrepreneurship and innovation is 
observable. Universities teach on how to become a successful entrepreneur, how to 
write a business plan and how to make decisions in an uncertain environment. There are 
many stories, how phenomena like globalization have supported entrepreneurial 
activities, especially in the developing world, and have therefore created opportunities 
for poor and disadvantaged people.67 But this interest and these stories about 
entrepreneurship are limited to the fields of business administration and sociology. The 
debate about the entrepreneur in economics is much more limited. 
 
The particular function of the entrepreneur has been a widely neglected role in modern 
economic theory.68 Mainstream economic theory, especially influenced by the 
economists of the University of Chicago, does not really consider the entrepreneur in its 
teaching. For neoclassical theorists, the entrepreneur is usually just one factor in their 
models like many others and is not considered because he is not mathematical 
perceivable. Their models are based on general equilibrium theory in which there is no 
role for the entrepreneur.69 
 
We will therefore explore a tradition of modern economic thought that has its origins in 
Austria.70 These economists have put much more emphasis on the role of the 
entrepreneur in the economy than any other school of thought. We will start with Frank 
Knight. His concept of entrepreneurship is closely linked to his understanding of 
                                                 
67 cf. Thomas L. Friedman, Die Welt ist flach. Eine kurze Geschichte des 21. Jahrhunderts,  
Frankfurt/Main 2006, et al. 
68 Rahim Taghizadegan, Unternehmer, Wertewirtschaft 2009, p. 2 
69 cf. Jesús Huerta de Soto, Die Österreichische Schule der Nationalökonomie – Markt und 
unternehmerische Kreativität. Wien 2007, p. 17 
70 What is considered today as the Austrian School of Economics is a tradition that was founded by Carl 
Menger during the Methodenstreit with German economists. One of Menger’s disciples was Eugen 
Böhm-Bawerk who became the teacher of Joseph Schumpeter and Ludwig v. Mises. One of Mises’ 
students during the 1920ies and 1930ies in Austria was Friedrich A. v. Hayek. After migrating to the US 
Mises, taught at New York University. Israel Kirzner, one of his students there, became a professor at 
New York University himself. After Mises’ death the Ludwig v. Mises Institute was established in 1982 
in Auburn, Alabama. Most of the economists that consider themselves as followers of the tradition of the 
Austrian School of Economics live in the US nowadays. 
For a thorough assessment of the history of the school cf. Jesús Huerta de Soto, Die Österreichische 
Schule der Nationalökonomie – Markt und unternehmerische Kreativität, Wien 2007 
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uncertainty that has been already discussed. The entrepreneur is acting in an 
environment of true uncertainty. Because of his special abilities, his confidence in his 
forecasting human needs and his trust in his own luck, he becomes an uncertainty-
bearer. Another thinker that is widely known for his contributions on entrepreneurship 
is Joseph Schumpeter. He was a student of Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk and lived in 
Austria but turned away from the principles of the Austrian school and focused more on 
econometrics in his later years. His understanding of the entrepreneur is that of an 
innovator who disequilibrates existing situations and elevates the economy on a higher 
level by introducing a new technology or a new method of production.  
 
We will talk about Ludwig v. Mises, also one of Böhm-Bawerks students, who has a 
very broad concept of entrepreneurial activity. He believes that there is an 
entrepreneurial element in every human action since entrepreneurship is always a 
response to an uncertain future and at the same time an uncertain future is a prerequisite 
for every human action. But he is also writing about a certain class of human beings 
who have more initiative and more venturesomeness. Though this role in the economy 
is not really fitting in Mises’ praxeological system, he calls these people promoters and 
argues their existence with the phenomenon of leadership in every branch of human 
activity. Friedrich A. v. Hayek, a student of Ludwig v. Mises, writes particularly about 
entrepreneurship as a discovery process in the economy. Though he did not focus so 
much on the individual and his role in the ongoing market process of discovering new 
information, he formulates the crucial argument of the dispersion of knowledge that is 
part of the foundation of later entrepreneurial theories. 
 
Israel Kirzner is the thinker who developes a consistent theory of entrepreneurship by 
combining the arguments of Hayek and Mises. He explores the particular 
entrepreneurial contribution to economics and created a concept of a pure entrepreneur 
who is alert to hitherto not discovered profit opportunities that he decides to exploit. 
Kirzner thinks, by referring to Mises, that the entrepreneur has no means of production 
and is therefore property-less. It is only his alertness that allows him to earn profits. 
This assumption is heavily criticized by Henry Hazlitt and Jack High, who stress the 
importance of uncertainty for economic activity, and Murray Rothbard, who emphasizes 
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the importance of an entrepreneur being at the same time also a capitalist. Kirzner’s 
market theory is that of a situation of disequilibrium (due to the dispersion of 
knowledge) in which the entrepreneurial activity fulfills a coordinative function and 
therefore drives the economy towards equilibrium. This theory is challenged by Ludwig 
Lachmann, who argues against any theory that assumes the possibility of the existence 
of a direction towards equilibrium within the economy. He uses the term kaleidic 
society introduced by Prof. Shackle to describe an economy in which he thinks the 
subjective theory of the Austrian school of economics is consistently applied. 
 
The last fellow of the Austrian school of economics we are exploring is Joseph T. 
Salerno. He advocates a different interpretation of Mises and Hayek than Kirzner does. 
He is emphasizing the promoter-entrepreneur of Mises and renames it as integral 
entrepreneur (because promoters have a different connotation nowadays than they had 
at the time when Mises published Human Action). The integral entrepreneur is at the 
same time also owner and risks his livelihood in order to gain profits. Hence he can also 
suffer real losses. 
 
This assessment of the different concepts of entrepreneurship shall equip us with a 
proper understanding of the relationship between uncertainty and entrepreneurship. This 
is especially important for our final investigation into the true meta-anthropological 
foundation of economics. 
 
3.1 The Judging Adventurer as Bearer of True Uncertainty (Knight) 
The Knightean approach to Entrepreneurship is based on the imperfection of knowledge 
(which will be one of the main arguments of Hayek as well) and the uncertainty about 
the future and hence the necessity to anticipate future conditions. The change of these 
conditions related to the prior anticipation is the underlying cause that gives rise to 
profit opportunities. For Frank Knight, profit is the difference between fixed costs of 
production and the uncertain future selling price. Entrepreneurial activity is motivated 
not by a stimulus in the past but by the future state of affairs and its anticipation. It is 
therefore characterized as spontaneous and forward-looking. “We perceive the world 
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before we react to it, and we react not to what we perceive, but always to what we 
infer.”71 
 
This inference is twofold for Knight. On the one hand, the entrepreneur has to infer the 
status of the future affairs without his interference. And on the other hand, he has to 
predict the future conditions including his action. Hence, successful entrepreneurship 
according to Knight is related to the ability of more accurately anticipating the future 
state of affairs. But the imagination of the change in the future state of affairs through 
the entrepreneurial interference is not just passive anticipation but rather active creation 
of possible future realities and the action to achieve this future reality. Though this 
psychological process involves rationality to make judgments from possible future 
results of activities, there is an essential intuitive process involved in creating the image 
of the future state of affairs that goes beyond the rationalistic assessment of future profit 
opportunities. 
 
Hence, entrepreneurship according to Knight requires two essential steps. First, there 
has to take place a creative process to find out possible outcomes of the future state of 
affairs. Afterwards, these possible outcomes have to be judged upon their certainty. This 
judgment on the probability of the results of entrepreneurial activity may not necessarily 
lead to a decision for the best plan (highest profits) but to the plan that is in the 
entrepreneur’s eyes most likely to succeed. This “probability” judgment is closely 
related to the concept of uncertainty. If the future is fundamentally uncertain, how can 
there be any sort of probability? Knight addresses this question: “More or less based on 
experience and observation of the outcome of his predictions, it is doubtless principally 
after all simply an intuitive judgment or "unconscious induction," as one prefers.”72 
 
To clarify the meaning of probability for entrepreneurship, Frank Knight distinguishes 
three types of probability.73 (1) A priori probability: on the same logical plane as 
mathematical propositions and can be called  as "ultimately" inductions from experience 
                                                 
71 Knight, Risk, Uncertainty and Profit, 2006, p. 201 [italics in original] 
72 Knight, Risk, Uncertainty and Profit, 2006, p. 227 
73 cf. Knight, Risk, Uncertainty and Profit, 2006, pp. 224 et seqq. 
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(2) Statistical probability. Empirical classification of instances74: evaluation of the 
frequency of association between predicates, not analyzable into varying combinations 
of equally probable alternatives. (3) Estimates: no valid basis of any kind for classifying 
instances. 
 
He states the following examples for the three kinds of probabilities. In a game of 
chance, the instances form a homogenous group and an a priori determination of 
probability is possible. It is more difficult for instances of fire hazards – the probability 
for these events are due to empirical investigation and are used for statistical 
probabilities. The third kind of probability can be applied to entrepreneurial activity. 
Since cases of entrepreneurial action are usually quite unique and very complex and 
since there is a kind of uncertainty that does not lie within the scope of mathematical 
calculation, these probabilities are pure estimates. This uncertainty, which Knight calls 
true uncertainty, is the rationale for the existence of enterprises and the justification for 
the entrepreneurial profit: “It is this true uncertainty which by preventing the 
theoretically perfect outworking of the tendencies of competition gives the characteristic 
form of "enterprise" to economic organization as a whole and accounts for the peculiar 
income of the entrepreneur.”75 
 
Due to the forward-looking character of entrepreneurial activity, there are two kinds of 
uncertainty the entrepreneur has to deal with: (1) he has to estimate the results of his 
economic activity – the quality and quantity of goods he will be able to produce with 
the available resources and (2) he has to estimate future human wants he would like to 
satisfy. Knight describes two fundamental and four additional methods of dealing with 
uncertainty: (1) consolidation and (2) specialization are approaches to group instances 
of uncertainty. The remaining methods are (3) control of the future, (4) increased power 
of prediction, (5) diffusion and simply (6) avoidance. 
 
Frank Knight uses the term adventurer for a proper description of the process by a 
person who makes a venture and becomes a bearer of uncertainty. Knight points out that 
                                                 
74 Any high degree of confidence that the proportions found in the past will hold in the future is still based 
on an a priori judgment of indeterminateness. 
75 Knight, Risk, Uncertainty and Profit, 2006, p. 230 [italics in original] 
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there is no way to be certain about the future. It is this particular aspect that he is certain 
about his judgment and evaluation of the future state of affairs that characterizes an 
entrepreneur. There are some characteristics an entrepreneur should possess in order to 
be successful. According to Knight, these are76: (1) the capacity in predicting the future, 
especially the ability to forecast the conduct of other men, (2) the capacity to judge 
means and plan adjustment necessary for the anticipated future status, (3) the power to 
execute these plans, (4) confidence in his decisions and (5) the conative attitude to a 
situation upon which judgment is passed with a given degree of confidence meaning the 
disposition to "trust in one's luck". 
 
Though Frank Knight is considered the founder of the Chicago school of economics77, 
his basic economic assumptions differ essentially from the teachings of the school 
today. His emphasis on the uncertainty of the future (the main entrepreneurial argument 
of Mises) and the imperfection of knowledge (the main entrepreneurial argument of 
Hayek) draw him very close to the Austrian school of economics. We will now start an 
assessment of the school’s concept of the entrepreneur. 
 
3.2 The Innovator (Schumpeter)  
We want to start with Joseph Schumpeter’s concept of the entrepreneur. He is widely 
known for having written extensively on entrepreneurship. He is especially known for 
his term creative destruction implicit in the capitalist economic model; additionally, the 
entrepreneur as the main destructive force in the economy is a frequently cited passage 
from one of his later books: Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy78. This conception 
has to be understood in the context of his general economic framework. While in his 
early years he was heavily influenced by the concepts of his teachers Menger and 
Böhm-Bawerk, he turned very soon in his career to the marginalism of Leon Wallras.79 
While Menger focused on the individual human being and his behavior as most relevant 
for economic analysis, Wallras introduced to economics what is now known as general 
                                                 
76 cf. Knight, Risk, Uncertainty and Profit, 2006, p. 241f 
77 The Chicago School of Economics is nowadays known for being the source of neoclassical mainstream 
economics with a distinct econometric approach that wants to assess human behavior by formulating 
complex mathematical models. Several nobel laureats like Milton Friedman, Gary Becker, Richard 
Posner, et al. were members of the faculty. 
78 Joseph Schumpeter: Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. New York, London, et al. 2008 
79 Friedrich A. v. Hayek, „Preface“ in Joseph Schumpeter, Methodological Individualism, Bruxelles 1980 
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equilibrium theory. This concept paved the way for the takeover of mathematics and 
statistics in economics and is now a dominant theory in neoclassical economics. The 
theory assumes that markets are in equilibrium and therefore economic activity can by 
assessed by building up abstract models and calculating human behavior as 
homogenous units that act in accordance with mathematical laws. From this point of 
view, entrepreneurial activity has to be disturbing for equilibrium because it changes the 
current state of affairs and lifts the market equilibrium on a higher level. But there is no 
role for the entrepreneur in the state of equilibrium: “The tendency is for the 
entrepreneur to make neither profit nor loss in the circular flow – that is he has so 
function of a special kind there, he simply does not exist.”80 
 
In Schumpeter’s concept it is not the consumer who brings change about by developing 
new wants, but the producer who introduces a new combination. He outlines five 
different cases for new combinations (entrepreneurial activity)81: (1) introduction of a 
new good or a new quality of a good, (2) a new method of production that has not yet 
been tested by experience, (3) the opening of a new market, (4) the conquest of a new 
source of supply of raw materials or half-manufactured goods, and (5) the carrying out 
of the new organization of any industry. 
 
The function of Schumpeter’s entrepreneur is to carry out new combinations. New 
combinations are not only characterized by their invention by the entrepreneur, but they 
have to be an innovation and have to be successful on the market. Every individual who 
is fulfilling this entrepreneurial function can therefore be called an entrepreneur 
regardless of whether he is connected to an individual firm or if he is dependent in the 
many ways as employee, manager or in another kind of a relationship to a firm. 
Schumpeter distinguishes between entrepreneurs who carry out new combinations and 
capitalists who own the money.82 But the entrepreneurial function appears always 
mixed with other activities. 
 
                                                 
80 Joseph Schumpeter, Theory of Economic Development, New Brunswick, London 2008, p. 76 
81 cf. Schumpeter, Theory of Economic Development, 2008, p. 66 
82 cf. Schumpeter, Theory of Economic Development, 2008, p. 75 
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Contrary to Knight Schumpeter’s entrepreneur is neither bearing risk nor uncertainty. 
This function is carried out by the capitalist. This is also the reason why Schumpeter 
sees entrepreneurial profit as a factor payment for the entrepreneurial factor input.83 
Profit is neither gained by the difference between selling price and costs nor by bearing 
uncertainty, but profit is a component of the factor costs. This is as a matter of fact a 
fundamentally different conception compared to Frank Knight or the views of some 
economists of the Austrian school of economics. We will also see that this is one of the 
main reasons for disputes within the tradition of the Austrian school. 
 
3.3 The Promoter (Mises) 
Ludwig v. Mises has a very general concept of entrepreneurship. It is directly linked to 
uncertainty and to human action. All human action is carried out to remove uneasiness; 
uneasiness exists and can be removed because time and the future matter and because 
there is uncertainty about the future. So all human action is done under a condition of 
uncertainty and has therefore entrepreneurial character. Mises rejects the notion of an 
evenly rotating economy completely (something like a general equilibrium, stressed by 
Leon Walras and his disciples) – he is convinced that there is no such status possible in 
the world because this would mean to remove all uneasiness. Since human action would 
not take place because there is no uncertainty, he compares this status with an ant hill.84 
He distinguishes the different procedures adopted by economists as either the logical 
method, which recognizes uncertainty and the role of the entrepreneur in the economy, 
or the mathematical method, which reduces these fundamental realities to a model that 
lies within the scope of the technique. Mises considers his own approach as an 
application of the logical method to economics. 
 
For Mises, entrepreneurship has a distributive role in economics and hence has to be 
very broad. Nonetheless he acknowledges a narrower notion of this function in regard to 
persons who are “especially eager to profit from adjusting production to the expected 
changes in conditions, those who have more initiative, more venturesomeness, and a 
quicker eye than the crowd, the pushing and promoting pioneers of economic 
                                                 
83 cf. Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, New York/London 2008 p. 83 
84 cf. von Mises, Human Action, 2006, p. 248 
42 
improvement.”85 He calls these persons promoters. For Mises, the entrepreneur-
promoter is not possible to be reflected properly in the praxeological system. But Mises 
admits that due to the inequality of men, there are people in the market who can be 
considered as promoters and have an important role as pacemakers and as the driving 
force in the market economy. The phenomenon of leadership exists in economics like in 
all other aspects of human life. Promoters have the supreme ability to be the first in 
understanding the discrepancies between what is done and what could be done and, with 
their speculative ventures, they are the ones who revolutionize afresh prices each day. 
 
Though Mises has a very general concept of the entrepreneurial aspects of human 
action, he developed more specifically the idea of the entrepreneurial function: “The 
specific entrepreneurial function consists in determining the employment of the factors 
of production. The entrepreneur is the man who dedicates them to special purposes.”86 
Though the entrepreneur acts motivated by selfish interest, his profit depends on the 
approval of his conduct by the consumer – so he can only succeed if he best serves the 
consumer. The entrepreneur decides how much money shall be invested in particular 
lines of business, the size of the total business, the main sections and the financial 
structure. Mises calls these decisions judgments about the future states of the market. 
These decisions are made by the entrepreneur alone – any help in gathering the 
necessary information for these decisions by experts from the fields of law, statistics 
and technology are only ancillary in nature. The execution of the decision may be 
entrusted to managers. 
 
The entrepreneur hires different people to carry out definite kinds of work but qua 
entrepreneur he is the one who directs his labor toward definite goals. Mises describes a 
manager as a junior partner of the entrepreneur who serves the entrepreneurial function 
as best as possible due to his own financial interest but whose sphere of action is limited 
and precisely determined. Double-entry book-keeping makes it possible for the 
entrepreneur to not be involved in too much detail but to be able to build a managerial 
hierarchy. Within this system of business calculation, the firm is separated in different 
entities and the entrepreneur can assign to the different management sections a great 
                                                 
85 von Mises, Human Action, 2006, pp. 254 et seq. 
86 von Mises, Human Action, 2006, pp. 290 et seq. 
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deal of independence. The only directive he gives to the management is to make as 
much profit as possible.87 But the managerial function is always subservient to the 
entrepreneurial function that controls the factors of production and brings the 
entrepreneurial profit or loss. Mises thinks that it is not important if the manager’s 
income is in proportion to the profit earned by his section because he is under any 
circumstances interested in the success of that part of the business that has been 
entrusted to him. It can even become counterproductive for the entrepreneur if he gives 
the manager completely free hands in his operations because he would speculate with 
the entrepreneur’s money without being accountable for the losses. 
 
Mises’ concept of profit has also quite a broad meaning according to his very general 
concept of entrepreneurship. “Profit, in a broader sense, is the gain derived from action; 
[…] it is the difference between the higher value attached to the result arraigned and the 
lower value attached to the sacrifices made for its attainment”88. Mises characterizes 
profit and loss as psychic phenomenon and therefore not open for measurement. Applied 
to market economics in a context of money, profit can be gained through different 
prices. This profit is however a social phenomenon and reflects the appraisal of one’s 
contribution to societal effort by the other members of society. Mises links 
entrepreneurial profit, like Knight, to the ability to anticipate future, uncertain events. 
The better he is able to anticipate these future states of affairs, the more successful he 
will be. Entrepreneurial profits and losses are created through a discrepancy between 
anticipated prices and real prices in future markets. 
 
Mises distinguishes entrepreneurial profit in a stationary economy from that in a 
progressing economy. In a stationary economy profits have to be counterbalanced by 
other entrepreneur’s losses. In a progressing economy additional capital goods are 
injected into the economy and the total sum of income produced is increased. This raise 
of income is due to an expansion of production or to the improvement of technological 
methods. In a progressing economy entrepreneurial profit is a share of this increase in 
the total sum of new generated income. But Mises points out that the laws of the market 
divide this additional wealth among the different participants (suppliers of labor and of 
                                                 
87 cf. von Mises, Human Action, 2006, p. 306 
88 von Mises, Human Action, 2006, p. 289 
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certain material factors of production) and the lion’s share goes to the non-
entrepreneurial groups.89  
 
Due to a tendency of the market to always move in the direction of final prices and the 
final state of rest, entrepreneurial profit is not a lasting phenomenon but always 
temporary. And there is no relation of profit or loss to the employed capital – profit or 
loss is only determined by the entrepreneur’s ability to adjust to the change in demands 
of the consumer. So the entrepreneurial function – the entrepreneur’s striving for profits 
– is the driving force of the economy; profits and losses are devices of the consumers to 
exercise supremacy on the market and are also a reflection of the consumers’ most 
urgent needs. This supremacy also shifts the means of production from less efficient to 
more efficient agents in the market.90 What is popularly considered as profit is the 
dividend of a corporation. Mises clarifies that this is mere interest on the invested 
capital plus part of the profit that is earned and not reinvested back into the business. 
 
3.4 The Discoverer (Hayek) 
Hayek’s notion of the entrepreneurial process is closely linked to his knowledge 
argument for a free economy. Since we do not know the special circumstances of agents 
in the market, entrepreneurship and competition are necessary. Hayek considers 
competition “systemically as a procedure to discover facts”91. Hayek’s approach to 
entrepreneurship is rather systematic. He does not focus on the procedure that takes 
place in the entrepreneurial act (like Knight), he does not describe the characteristics of 
the entrepreneurial person (like Mises) but he focuses on the results and the necessity of 
entrepreneurship and competition in the market process. Hayek admits that the validity 
of the theory of entrepreneurship can never be empirically verified because it is by 
definition a method to discover not yet known facts. 
 
Hayek mentions that all discovery processes and science in general cannot be 
empirically proven – the established methods are employed because they have produced 
                                                 
89 cf. von Mises, Human Action, 2006, p. 295 
90 cf. von Mises, Human Action, 2006, p. 299 
91 Friedrich A. Hayek, “Competition as a Discovery Process” in The Quarterly Journal of Austrian 
Economics,2002, p. 9 
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better results than others in the past. The difference of economic and scientific 
discovery process is that the former focuses on temporary circumstances while the latter 
is seeking general facts. Hence the theory of competition in economics cannot be used 
to predict particular events in the future. This would be possible only in a true economy, 
a uniform scale of values determining the needs that are satisfied and those that are not. 
Hayek therefore usually uses the word catallaxy92 for the market economy where a 
spontaneous order by the process of competition is established and is a result of an 
inhomogeneous scale of values. 
 
Hayek distinguishes the situation in developed and not yet developed countries. Poor 
countries are even more in need of sound procedures of competition because this is also 
some sort of impersonal coercion that can bring about changes in individual’s behavior 
that are not possible through instructions or commands.93 People who want to try out 
possibilities and improve their situation are necessary for competition. Hayek states that 
he has observed mostly the same proportion of people everywhere who are willing to 
act entrepreneurially unless they are prevented from that. 
 
Some facts competition should explore are which goods are scarce, which things are 
goods and how scarce or valuable they are. A field in which competition is still 
inefficient is one factor of production: human labor. Hayek calls one of the main 
problems of economic policy the rigidity of wages.94 Since there is no competition 
among workers there are a lot of implications not only for monetary theory but also for 
entrepreneurial activity. The shortages on the labor market due to the policies 
implemented by the trade unions are not only causing higher unemployment rates but 
are also stifling entrepreneurial ventures in the market economy because the real value 
of one of the factors of production cannot be discovered but is given through legislation. 
 
 
 
                                                 
92 This term was used by F.A. Hayek in Law, Legislation, and Liberty, Vol. 2, pp. 108–9 in order to 
describe the market with a better word than economy. The greek roots of economy imply some sort of 
shared ends – catallaxy is interaction of agents with different ends. 
93 cf. Hayek, “Competition as a Discovery Process”, 2002, p. 19 
94 cf. Hayek, “Competition as a Discovery Process”, 2002, p. 22 
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3.5 The Alert, Equilibrating Arbitrageur (Kirzner) 
Israel Krizner is considered the main thinker in the Austrian School of Economics who 
developed the concept of human action and the entrepreneurial element therein to a full 
concept of entrepreneurship. This concept is closely links with the term alertness. 
Together with Joseph Schumpeter he is one of the main thinkers who reflects on the 
entrepreneur in 20th century economic theory. Kirzner works on a synthesis between 
Mises and Hayek and considered their writings as complementary. “From Mises the 
Austrians learned to see the market as an entrepreneurially driven process. From Hayek 
they learned to appreciate the role of knowledge and its enhancement, through market 
interaction, for the equilibrative process.”95 He outlines a theory of a competitive market 
economy that is driven by the entrepreneurial discovery process and is always in 
disequilibrium while the coordinating function of the entrepreneur is the main reason 
why it tends systematically towards equilibrium. 
 
In his first book Competition & Entrepreneurship in 1973, Kirzner outlined his theory 
of the pure entrepreneur, who is the price maker and exploits previously unnoticed 
profit opportunities. While the entrepreneurial discovery process in his early work has 
still quite large aspects of mechanical connotation (though he rejects these connotations 
and relates them to the economizing behavior in equilibrium theory), he puts more and 
more emphasis on the role of uncertainty and the speculative element of 
entrepreneurship in his later work.96 
 
Nature of Entrepreneurship 
Kirzner distinguishes the entrepreneur clearly from the capitalist and the hired manager. 
The role of entrepreneurship in the market is elusive. Entrepreneurial activity is an 
element present in all human action that is crucial to economizing activity in general but 
cannot itself be analyzed in terms of economizing, maximizing or efficiency criteria. 
Kirzner calls this aspect of human action the entrepreneurial element. Due to this fact 
that the “extraeconomic” activitiy of entrepreneurship is such a crucial factor in 
                                                 
95 Israel M. Kirzner, “Entrepreneurial Discovery and the Competitive Market Process: An Austrian 
Approach”, in Journal of Economic Literature, 1997, p. 67 
96 cf. Kirzner, “Entrepreneurial Discovery and the Competitive Market Process: An Austrian Approach”, 
1997 
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economics in general, the argument of individual maximizing activities within the 
market process is not fully appropriate for the understanding of economic phenomena. 
Entrepreneurial activity is outside of the scope of maximizing behavior.97 Kirzner 
emphasizes that his concept of the entrepreneur is pure and does not possess any capital. 
Kirzner calls the entrepreneurial ability to discover hitherto unnoticed profit 
opportunities alertness. 
 
While his book was appreciated in many ways by his colleagues, some also pointed out 
weaknesses in his concept of the pure entrepreneur. Henry Hazlitt for example is one of 
the early reviewers of Kirzner’s book. He gives credit to Kirzner’s contribution to price 
theory but he criticized Kirzner of “overstress[ing] the entrepreneur’s alertness and 
perception while under-emphazising his courage in taking risks.”98 Hazlitt alleges that 
Kirzner uses the term entrepreneur only for the successful entrepreneur. Hazlitt’s view 
is on the contrary that the entrepreneur not only has to be alert but he also must act on 
his alertness. By acting he is a capitalist plus – a capitalist willing to take unusual risks. 
 
Decision Making and Economizing 
Kirzner criticizes harshly the Robbinsian99 understanding of the market process that is 
made up of individuals who want to satisfy by their actions as many of their goals 
(according to their preference) as possible. He points out that especially this 
understanding of a given hierarchy of ends and the corresponding means to achieve 
these ends are misleading to an emphasis on equilibrium situations of markets, which 
Kirzner generally rejects. From Kirzner’s point of view, there would be no chance for 
exogenous elements to change circumstances and therefore no market process could be 
created. Hence, Kirzner turns to the Misesian term human action with its broader 
meaning of the acting individual motivated not just to apply certain means to given ends 
but to generally remove uneasiness. Kirzner admits, the Robbinsian model of 
economizing man may explain the phenomenon of cost-conscious search for 
                                                 
97 cf. Israel M. Kirzner, Competition & Entrepreneurship, London/Chicago 1973, p. 31 
98 Henry Hazlitt, Competition & Entrepreneurship by Israel M.Kirzner, The Freeman 1974, p. 759 
99 Krizner uses An essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science written by Lord Robbins in 
1932 
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information in the market but the given means-ends framework is not appropriate to 
investigate the market process as such. 
 
Kirzner introduces the term alertness for describing the entrepreneurial aspect of human 
decision-making.100 This notion stands for the understanding of human action as active, 
creative and human instead of passive, automatic and mechanic. The calculating aspect 
in human action is present but only partially and after the decision-maker has identified 
the relevant circumstances. The applied means-ends framework has to be perceived 
before it can be used as ground for decision-making. The recognition of an 
entrepreneurial element in human action not only helps to complete the allocative 
explanation of human action but it makes it possible to view a succession of different 
decisions by one individual as a sequence.101 Hence a change in individual’s decisions 
can be considered as a learning process generated by the experience of the decisions 
themselves. If there occurs such a change in decisions within a given means-ends 
framework this has to be understood as discontinuity.  
 
In the Market 
Krizner admits that in a world of perfect knowledge and prediction the mechanical 
interpretation of decision-making would work perfectly and he points out that the 
assumption of perfect knowledge in the economy would immediately remove all 
entrepreneurial elements from society. A world of imperfect knowledge gives meaning 
to a role in the economy that was by definition hitherto excluded and is entirely 
incapable of being characterized as economizing: The “pure entrepreneur, that is, a 
decision-maker whose entire role arises out of his alertness to hitherto unnoticed 
opportunities”102. The pure entrepreneur is that he is a decision-maker without any 
means. In a world of perfect knowledge, this concept of course would make no sense 
because without means no action would be possible. But in a world of imperfect 
knowledge unexploited profit opportunities always exist. These unexploited profit 
opportunities (buyers who have paid too high prices, sellers who have received too little 
prices) open up a scope of decision-making that is not economizing at all. The decision-
                                                 
100 cf. Kirzner, Competition & Entrepreneurship, 1973, p. 35 
101 cf. Kirzner, Competition & Entrepreneurship, 1973, p. 36 
102 Kirzner, Competition & Entrepreneurship, 1973, p. 39 [italics in original] 
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maker in a world of imperfect knowledge simply has to know where the unexploited 
profit opportunities are. If he has alertness for these opportunities, he can only be aware 
of them and discovers them. This is impossible if he is trying to satisfy his ends by 
behaving economizing. 
 
Randall Holcombe, a fellow of the Austrian school of economics currently teaching at 
Florida State University, enhances Kirzner’s theory of entrepreneurship in a paper in 
2003 on the Origins of Entrepreneurial Opportunities103. He illustrates how 
entrepreneurship enlarges the stock of future entrepreneurial opportunities. 
Entrepreneurship is portrayed as the engine for economic progress. Kirzner writes about 
entrepreneurial opportunities that can be discovered, but he does not cover the issue 
where these hitherto unnoticed entrepreneurial opportunities come from. Since the 
entrepreneur, according to Kirzner, only discovers and does not create the profit 
opportunity, we could think that there is a fixed stock of entrepreneurial opportunities 
and that each entrepreneurial act diminishes the amount of future profit opportunities. 
Holcombe points out that the opposite is true. He distinguishes between three sources of 
entrepreneurial opportunities: (1) factors that disequilibrate markets, (2) factors that 
enhance production possibilities, and (3) the effects of entrepreneurial activities 
themselves.104 Disequilibrating factors are changes in tastes, technologies, or available 
resources – usually the factors for economic activity in a neoclassical general 
equilibrium framework. Enhancing factors of production possibility are usually the 
extension of markets or the increase of income that allow new production methods to 
produce more profit. But, as Holcombe argues, the most important source for 
entrepreneurial opportunities is entrepreneurship itself.  
 
If an entrepreneur discovers a better process for producing an existing product, this also 
creates opportunities for potential input suppliers. Thus there is not a stock of 
entrepreneurial opportunities that can be used up as entrepreneurs take them; rather when 
entrepreneurs act on one opportunity they create additional entrepreneurial opportunities, 
so the more entrepreneurship there is in an economy, the more entrepreneurial 
                                                 
103 cf. Randall Holcombe, “The Origins of Entrepreneurial Opportunities” in The Review of Austrian 
Economics, 2003 
104 cf. Holcombe, “The Origins of Entrepreneurial Opportunities”, 2003, pp. 29 et seqq. 
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opportunities will be available for others. Entrepreneurship leads to more 
entrepreneurship.105 
 
Holcombe distinguishes entrepreneurship from research and development. Research and 
development (R & D) does not produce an environment for profit opportunities per se. 
Nevertheless, according to Holcombe, entrepreneurial opportunities are more likely to 
exist in such an environment because R&D discovers new knowledge that is one factor 
for increased alertness. Thus to contribute to economic progress, R & D has to focus on 
discovering new entrepreneurial opportunities and these opportunities should also be 
exploitable. Entrepreneurship itself cannot be “produced” but an environment in which 
entrepreneurial opportunities can be discovered and exploited can be created. 
 
Turning back to Kirzner’s investigation into entrepreneurship within the market, he 
separates the components of entrepreneurial and economizing aspects of human action. 
This is an artificial model because all human action is endowed with an entrepreneurial 
element since human action is a response to the uncertainty of the future. For the sake of 
analyzing human decisions, he uses this expedient assumption to separate human action 
into two entirely different components: the passive economizer and the pure 
entrepreneur. The economizers are passive price-takers optimizing against the 
background of assumed data. The activity of the pure entrepreneur is the source for all 
changes in prices, qualities and quantities of input and output.106 
 
This distinction is also valid for the function of the producer. In his producer-function 
he contributes his coordinating work as a factor to the production of goods. In his 
economizing-function, he is a mere price-taker. What is commonly recognized as 
theory of production, according to Kirzner, has nothing to do with entrepreneurship. As 
economizer the producer is a mere resource-owner and his action does not contain 
entrepreneurial aspects. If the revenue and cost-function are known, producing is merely 
a matter of calculation and the solution is already embedded in the data about revenues 
and costs. 
 
                                                 
105 Holcombe, “The Origins of Entrepreneurial Opportunities”, 2003, p. 41 
106 cf. Kirzner, Competition & Entrepreneurship, 1973, pp. 37 et seqq.  
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The pure entrepreneur as producer acts mainly between resource and product markets. 
Imperfect transactions between these two markets are likely to contain many unnoticed 
opportunities for more efficient uses of resources. This lack of coordination is reflected 
in price differences and opens up opportunities for pure entrepreneurial activity. “This 
activity will consist exclusively in buying resources and selling products.”107 The 
producer as a pure entrepreneur does not contribute any resources whatsoever and is 
neither hiring a working team nor buying all needed resources for carrying out the 
transaction. 
 
Profits 
For Kirzner, to distinguish between purely entrepreneurial profit and other forms of 
profit, the decision to act entrepreneurial is crucial. Entrepreneurial profit is generated 
by the following process: discovering an hitherto unnoticed difference in buying and 
selling prices, deciding to exploit this opportunity, and buying a good in order to sell it 
for a higher price at a later time. In this process no assets and resources other than the 
alertness for the opportunity are involved. Kirzner concludes: “The discovery of a profit 
opportunity means the discovery of something obtainable for nothing at all.”108 
 
There might be profit opportunities involving time-consuming activity which can also 
be considered as a resource. Also, the high selling price might not yet available when 
the buying price has to be paid. In order to gain pure entrepreneurial profit the expected 
selling price has to be big enough to surpass an interest rate that is attractive enough to 
persuade someone to lend the money to the entrepreneur. The money lender can of 
course be the entrepreneur himself. Hence, he would be entrepreneur and capitalist 
united in one person. But still, there is a particular difference between pure profit and 
pure interest and the role of the pure entrepreneur does not overlap with the role of the 
capitalist. 
 
Kirzner also discusses the problem of the particular point of time when a good is sold 
that has been purchased previously for a lower price. This could also be considered as a 
mere economizing act, searching for the highest price possible on the market. This is 
                                                 
107 Kirzner, Competition & Entrepreneurship, 1973, p. 44 [italics in original] 
108 Kirzner, Competition & Entrepreneurship, 1973, p. 48 [italics in original] 
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not the case because the “surplus of selling price over buying price is indeed pure profit 
if it is related back to the original entrepreneurial decision”109. Profit always has to be 
related back to the original decision. He gains no profit if the selling transaction is 
carried out independently from his original buying transaction. Obviously it is not easy 
to determine when exactly the decision for a particular transaction was made. Kirzner’s 
believes that at the same time a receipt can be viewed as pure entrepreneurial profit and 
also something other than profit. The character of a particular receipt depends on the 
character of the decision made. 
 
Kirzner’s concept of profits is challenged by Murray Rothbard in a book review. He 
praises Kirzner’s elaboration of the Mises-Hayekian approach to entrepreneurship but 
criticizes him on one of the core assumptions of his theory: the non-owning, almost 
ethereal being of the entrepreneur which Rothbard considers as being neoclassical and 
for sure not Austrian. “This is an unfortunate departure from the basic Austrian insight 
that the entrepreneur and the capitalist are one and the same, and that therefore the 
capitalist-entrepreneur always tries to maximize, not the amount of his profit, but the 
rate of return on his capital.”110 According to Rothbard his assumption leads to the 
incorrect understanding that profit is only a competitive return and has negative 
implications for the theory of monopoly. 
 
Knowledge 
Kirzner also rejects the concept of entrepreneurship that supposes superior command 
over information. In this concept, the entrepreneur is a person who just knows more 
about resources, prices and products. Profits are due to this superior knowledge. Again, 
this knowledge could be hired and is therefore a special kind of a productive factor and 
not the essence of entrepreneurship. Therefore, alertness is not the possession of special 
knowledge about the market but “the ‘knowledge’ of where to find market data”111. The 
entrepreneur who is alert then hires people with superior knowledge. 
 
                                                 
109 Kirzner, Competition & Entrepreneurship, 1973, p. 50 [italics in original] 
110 Murray Rothbard, “Competition and Entrepreneurship. By Israel M. Kirzner”, in Journal of Economic 
Literature 1974,  p. 903 
111 Kirzner, Competition & Entrepreneurship, 1973, p. 67 
  53 
Since knowledge of substantive market data can be hired, this might also be possible for 
alertness. But someone who hires an employee with alertness has shown himself of 
even greater alertness. Kirzner identifies a particular order of knowledge - 
entrepreneurial knowledge has the highest order. Not even hiring a factor of production 
is an essential entrepreneurial decision because an entrepreneur can also hire someone 
with the talent of making wise hiring decisions. Only the ultimate hiring decision is 
essential for the entrepreneur. 
 
In his later works, Kirzner also introduces the term of surprise as an essential element 
for the discovery of opportunity for profits. 
What distinguishes discovery (relevant to hitherto unknown profit opportunities) from 
successful search (relevant to the deliberate production of information which one knew 
one had lacked) is that the former (unlike the latter) involves that surprise which 
accompanies the realization that one had overlooked something in fact readily 
available.112 
This surprise has nothing to do with happy accidents but is a succession of natural 
alertness to unexploited profit opportunities. This notion of discovery is situated in the 
midway between deliberately produced information and sheer windfall gain generated 
by pure chance. 
 
Equilibrating Process 
One important insight Kirzner emphazises is the understanding of the market rather as a 
process than as equilibrium. The market is constantly in a situation of disequilibrium 
and ignorance is widespread. Many profit opportunities are count up because the market 
participants are not aware of them. The mechanical Robbinsian theory lacks an 
explanation how the economizing man can overcome this situation. There is no theory 
how yesterday’s plans are replaced by new ones. Kirzner points out that men can learn 
from their experience. Expectations can change. Entrepreneurs can learn from mistakes 
of market participants in the past that produced less-than-optimal results of their actions. 
This also creates corresponding alteration in plans.113 
 
                                                 
112 Kirzner, “Entrepreneurial Discovery and the Competitive Market Process: An Austrian Approach”, 
1997, p. 72 
113 cf. Kirzner, Competition & Entrepreneurship, 1973, p. 71 
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Ludwig Lachmann criticizes this notion of the equilibrating process and published a 
paper called From Mises to Shackle: An Essay on the Austrian Economics and the 
Kaleidic Society. In this paper he attempts to apply the theories of Professor Shackle’s 
Epistemics and Economics to the Austrian School of Economics. The article was written 
to attack the common assumption of neoclassical economics, particularly the general 
equilibrium theory. Lachmann wants to find a common outlook of Shackle and Mises 
by examining the Austrian position with regard to Shackle’s kaleidic society, a society 
of unpredicted changes, “interspersing its moments or intervals of order, assurance and 
beauty with sudden disintegration and a cascade into a new pattern”114. 
 
In neoclassical theory, as Lachmann points out, there is no difference between data and 
knowledge. But in fact we can distinguish these two concepts in the following way: data 
must be measureable, knowledge is not. All assumptions of knowledge connected with 
the general equilibrium theory are therefore to some extend problematic. According to 
Lachmann, the Austrian school of economics has a different approach. Hayek’s 
dispersion of knowledge serves as a basis for the further developed theory about the 
creation of new knowledge. This new knowledge is created either exogenously by 
technical progress and discovery of new resources by alert minds or endogenously 
within the market by the same alert minds exploiting profit opportunities from changes 
in the pattern of relative prices. Mises coines the term praxeology derived from Max 
Weber’s writings. Praxeology focuses the science of economics on human action. For 
Mises, Human action is by definition rational but there is no constancy in human action. 
“Only in one respect can acting be constant: in preferring the more valuable to the less 
valuable. If the valuations change, acting must change also.”115 
 
Lachmann, by following Mises, puts an emphasis on the concept of time in economics. 
Mises criticizes that the mechanical measurement of time is only measuring the past and 
that philosophical concepts of time only consider the past and the future. The presence 
is usually just the point that separates the two. By referring to Bergson, Mises puts an 
emphasis on the present in which action takes place and reality is embodied. Mises and 
                                                 
114 G. L. S. Shackle, Epistemics and Economic: A Critique of Economic Doctriness, Cambridge 1972, p. 
76 
115 von Mises, Human Action, 1996, p. 113 
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Shackle also share the opinion that it is not an appropriate to use probabilities in order 
to deal with uncertainty in human action. As discussed earlier, Mises distinguishes two 
concepts of probability: (1) Case probability, which is not open to numerical evaluation, 
and (2) class probability. 
 
Lachmann points out that Shackle differs from Mises and Hayek in three main points:116 
(1) he has applied subjectivism not only to tastes but also to expectations, (2) he puts a 
challenge on the assumption that the market has a coordinating function for 
expectations and (3) especially in stock markets there is no tendency at all towards a 
long-run equilibrium. The subjectivity of expectations is at the core of these three 
assumptions. Expectations are the anticipation of future knowledge. But there is no 
ordering process of expectations in the market that substitutes old knowledge with 
superior knowledge. Superior expectations do not exist because expectations never turn 
into reality. In the stock market where the volatility is much higher than in product 
markets this is particularly true. These asset markets are inherently restless. While in the 
product market the achievement of equilibrium is possible to some extent, according to 
Lachmann, this is totally different in asset markets. Since titles on permanent income 
streams are traded there, there are no dates that could move nearer and cause more 
certainty about the future prices and thus yields the price development towards 
equilibrium. 
 
Lachmann rejects the existence of a direction of the market process towards a state of 
equilibrium for product markets to some extend but especially for asset markets. The 
reality of Shackle’s kaleidic society is an ultimate application of the subjectivity 
principle to economics. Since the future is uncertain, unexpected changes in knowledge 
and expectations can always occur. The kaleidic society, as Lachmann points out, is 
attractive to be considered as part of an Austrian approach to economics. It applies 
consistently of the core principles of the Austrian school of economics. 
 
 
 
                                                 
116 cf. Ludwig M. Lachmann,“From Mises to Shackle: An Essay on Austrian Economics and the Kaleidic 
Society”, in Journal of Economic Literature 1976, pp. 59 et seq. 
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Uncertainty 
Israel Kirzner has put more emphasis on the phenomenon of uncertainty in his later 
works. While in Competition & Entrepreneurship he leaves almost no role of 
uncertainty for entrepreneurship, he considers this element later particularly in 
responses to various critiques. By introducing time as an important factor in his theory 
he broadens his concept of alertness. He adds the aspect of the response to an uncertain 
future. This is not a mere passive response but an active vision of the future that also 
motivates man to act according to this vision. “We call this motivated propensity of man 
to formulate an image of the future man’s alertness.”117 This broader alertness now 
includes ways in which human agents can create the future by imaginative, bold leaps of 
faith and determination. Kirzner sticks to his principles when he outlines that the 
entrepreneurial element in human action has two aspects: (1) a function to perform, to 
create a vision (2) that is always motivated by profit opportunities switching on 
alertness. 
 
Introducing time implies that human action not only considered as a single-period case 
(alertness only discover hitherto unnoticed opportunities) but also as a multi-period case 
(active creation of a vision of the future is possible). “In particular the futurity that 
entrepreneurship must confront introduces the possibility that the entrepreneur may, by 
his own creative actions, in fact construct the future as he wishes it to be.”118 
 
Though this creative element is important for entrepreneurship, the entrepreneur is still 
motivated by profits and he has in fact a coordinative role in the economy reducing gaps 
of different prices on the factor and the product market. The entrepreneur is not solely 
an uncertainty-bearer but he rather pushes aside the swirling fogs of uncertainty. In 
1997, Kirzner uses not uncertainty but the term “sheer” ignorance or unknown 
ignorance when he discusses the phenomenon of imperfection of knowledge. 
 
                                                 
117 Israel M. Kirzner, “Uncertainty, Discovery and Human Action: A Study of the Entrepreneurial Profile 
in the Misesian System”, in Method, Process, and Austrian Economics. Essays in Honor of Ludwig von 
Mises. Massachusetts 1982, p. 149 
118 Kirzner, “Uncertainty, Discovery and Human Action”, 1982, p. 155 
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Jack High criticizes Kirzner for not having considered uncertainty in a proper way 
before his article in 1982. According to High, Kirzner was always dealing with 
ignorance and considering entrepreneurship as a process that is removing ignorance.119 
Kirzner, in his later writings, believes that uncertainty provides an additional scope for 
entrepreneurship but is not fundamentally changing the subject of entrepreneurship. An 
entrepreneur is in fact an active bearer of uncertainty (he peers through the fog) and 
entrepreneurial activity involves foresight and judgment. But these facts are not 
sufficient for alertness in the Kirznerian sense.120 According to High, Kirzner wants to 
develop the idea of entrepreneurship according to the teachings of Mises. But in doing 
so, he drifts apart in significant ways from his teacher’s concept of entrepreneurship. 
For Mises, uncertainty is an essential element of the entrepreneurial aspect in human 
action.  
 
Schumpeter and Knight 
Kirzner identifies similarities between his theory and Schumpeter’s model: the 
entrepreneur does not contribute factor services of production and the profit is not 
compensation necessary to attract the input of the entrepreneur into the production 
process. Imperfect knowledge creates for both theories a scope for an additional 
dimension of decision-making that cannot be fitted into the Robbinsian ends-means 
framework. 
 
The main difference between Schumpeter and Kirzner is the fact that the Schumpeterian 
entrepreneur acts disequilibrating. By initiating change, he generates new opportunities 
and disturbs an existing equilibrium. The entrepreneur is an exogenous force, not 
crucial for the market process in the status of equilibrium. He breaks away from the 
routine and is therefore able to create temporary gaps between price of inputs and 
outputs. For Kirzner, on the other hand, the entrepreneur “brings into mutual adjustment 
those discordant elements which resulted from prior market ignorance”121. He is not a 
creator ex nihilo but is alert to opportunity and exploits opportunities that already 
                                                 
119 cf. Jack High, “Alertness and Judgment: Comment on Kirzner”, in Method, Process, and Austrian 
Economics. Essays in Honor of Ludwig von Mises. Massachusetts 1982, p. 161 
120 cf. High, “Alertness and Judgment: Comment on Kirzner”, 1982, p. 163 
121 Kirzner, Competition & Entrepreneurship, 1973, p. 73 
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existed and were waiting for being noticed. The function of Kirzner’s entrepreneur is 
not shifting curves of costs and revenues but noticing that they have already shifted. 
 
Kirzner identifies two main similarities with Frank Knight’s concept of the 
entrepreneur: (1) Ultimate control is intertwined with the concept of ultimate 
responsibility and both are essential for entrepreneurship. He relates these concepts with 
his own notion of ultimate knowledge, which is alertness. (2) Knight points out that in 
the theory of the firm profit is generated dynamically by entrepreneurial decisions due 
to uncertainty. This concept is related to necessity of alertness within the firm in order 
to generate entrepreneurial profit.122 
 
Kirzner discovers a difference in Knight’s overemphasis of uncertainty. Kirzner is 
missing some essential characteristics of the entrepreneur in Knight’s theory. An 
entrepreneur does not act because the future is uncertain but because he sees an 
attractive profit opportunity in this uncertain future of which he believes in being able to 
exploit this opportunity. Hence, for Kirzner, it is rather the alertness to profit 
opportunities that is the essential entrepreneurial element than to bear uncertainty. 
 
3.6 The Integral Entrepreneur (Salerno) 
Joseph T. Salerno is another fellow of the Austrian school of economics who develops 
his own theory based on Mises Hayek and Rothbard. According to Salerno, in this 
tradition there exist also other concepts than the Kirznerian entrepreneur who is a pure 
decision-maker with superior alertness but owns no resources. Salerno quotes Mises: 
“The function of the entrepreneur cannot be separated from the direction of the 
employment of the factors of production for the accomplishment of definite tasks. The 
entrepreneur controls the factors of production; it is this control that brings him either 
entrepreneurial profit or loss.”123 
 
Salerno traces the origin of the contemporary conception of the entrepreneur as 
propertyless and pure decision-maker who earns profits by discovering back to Kirzner. 
                                                 
122 cf. Kirzner, Competition & Entrepreneurship, 1973, pp. 82 et seqq. 
123 von Mises, Human Action, 1996, p. 302 
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He misinterpreted Mises’ analytical approach to the various factor incomes in the 
market economy. Mises always emphasized that his concept of the pure entrepreneur is 
just an imaginary construction and that the fullness of entrepreneurial activity in the real 
market process is captured by the promoter-entrepreneur. Salerno redubs this concept 
with the phrase “integral entrepreneur”124. Salerno examines how this misunderstanding 
could have come across. The pure entrepreneur in Mises’ writings is introduced to 
separate incomes from different functions which are purely imaginary. The laborer 
earns wages by disposing labor services, the landowner and capitalist earn a pure 
interest return by refraining from present consumption, and the entrepreneur earns 
profits or suffers losses by his ability in anticipating the changes of the market data. 
Uncertainty of the future in all of these functions causes a speculative element which 
implies entrepreneurial gains or losses. According to Mises, these gains and losses 
purely psychic and never monetary.125 The concept of the pure entrepreneur was 
invented to isolate and analyze implication of uncertainty for the formation of catallactic 
incomes (monetary profits and losses). 
 
Integral Entrepreneur 
Salerno points out that the entrepreneur who is not bearing the losses of his failed 
venture is in fact an employee of the capitalist and the property owner is the real 
entrepreneur in this relationship. He is the only one who can bear the burden of 
uncertainty. Mises uses the term “promoter” to describe persons in the economy that are 
especially eager to profit from adjusting production to the expected changes in 
conditions. They have quicker eye than the crowd. They are the pushing and promoting 
pioneers of economic improvement. Since the term promoter is nowadays used for 
someone who arranges financing for big events the expression is misleading. 
 
Therefore, Salerno suggests to use the phrase “’integral’ entrepreneur who integrates the 
praxeologically indivisible roles of uncertainty bearer, capital investor, and property 
owner.”126 The concept of the integral entrepreneur is limited to certain human beings 
                                                 
124 Joseph T. Salerno, “The Entrepreneur: Real and Imagined”, in Quarterly Journal of Austrian 
Economics 2008, p. 190 
125 cf. Salerno, “The Entrepreneur: Real and Imagined”, 2008, p. 192 (footnote) 
126 Salerno, “The Entrepreneur: Real and Imagined”, 2008, p. 194 
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with specific characteristics. They earn their livelihood in risking their property to gain 
entrepreneurial profits. Mises calls them pacemakers and relates the phenomenon of 
their existence to the general phenomenon of leadership in other branches of human 
activity. The monetary success of the entrepreneur is usually ranked by his ability to 
fulfill consumer’s wants. He is eager to apply the cheapest production methods 
available. The integral entrepreneur promotes himself into the position of organizing 
and directing the factors of production. But not all property owners and capitalist-
investors are integral entrepreneurs. This requires also being first in understanding the 
discrepancy between what is done and what could be done. For Mises the concept of the 
promoter is like the concept of money – it cannot be defined with praxeological rigor – 
only by historical judgment. 
 
Pre-Miseans 
Salerno investigates the most important influences on Mises for his concept of the 
integral entrepreneur starting with Carl Menger. Menger enumerated four aspects of 
entrepreneurial activity: (1) obtaining information about the economic situation, (2) 
economic calculation of revenues and costs to ensure sufficiency, (3) an act of will to 
assign goods of higher order to a particular production process, (4) supervision of the 
execution to secure an economic production. The entrepreneur, who is also the owner of 
the firm, gives meaning and structure to a complex of capital goods and shapes it with 
his own personality. He is the one who gives a purpose to the enterprise. Salerno 
explains that Böhm-Bawerk (one of the main teachers of Mises) followed Menger in his 
analysis on the capitalist-entrepreneur but did not pay so much attention on the 
entrepreneur and rather focused on the determination of the interest rate. 
 
According to Salerno, John Bate Clark, who was quite influential on Mises, invented 
the imagery construction of the pure entrepreneur in order to analyze the determination 
of functional income shares. He also distinguishes between a static economy (which 
Mises adopted in his evenly rotating economy) and a dynamic concept. In a static 
condition there are no profit and losses and the entrepreneur is merely the universal 
paymaster. But in a dynamic society the entrepreneur makes the supreme decisions 
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which lead to changes in the business. Salerno argues that the enabling act of Clark (that 
is crucial in a dynamic society) is a similar concept like Menger’s the act of the will.127 
 
Salerno states that Frank Fetter came closest to conception of his integral entrepreneur. 
Fetter distinguishes between the passive investor and the active capitalist. In the real 
world the difference is still only a matter of degree. Fetter uses the term enterpriser to 
describe the active capitalist-investor. For him, uncertainty-bearing is also directly 
linked with ownership. Fetter conceives the entrepreneur as pushing himself to the fore 
and being exposed to risk. He is an economic buffer who is the first to feel influence of 
changing conditions. Salerno concludes that “all four pre-Misesians characterized the 
entrepreneur as a capitalist and owner in addition to a restless, venturesome, promoting 
uncertainty-bearer.”128 
 
Ludwig v. Mises and Murray Rothbard 
Salerno examines Ludwig v. Mises’ concept of the entrepreneur and points out that the 
integral entrepreneur embodies three separate functions: capitalist, owner and 
entrepreneur. “For the capitalist reaps interest for the function of postponing present 
consumption and investing the savings, and the entrepreneur earns profits (incurs 
losses) for his relative success (failure) in correctly anticipating and adjusting 
production to future events.”129 Ownership is related to choosing and supervising the 
investment and therefore is a peculiar form of labor and generates quasi-rents. 
Entrepreneurial profits and losses on the other hand depend on the ability to adjust to 
the most urgent wants of consumers. The fact of ownership also distinguishes the 
entrepreneur from the manager in Mises’ theory. Mises claims that a successful 
corporation is never controlled by a hired manager. 
 
Salerno thinks that Rothbard ignored Mises’ work in this field because Mises used the 
nebulous term “quasi-rents”. Rothbard turned directly to Böhm-Bawerk in adopting the 
term “capitalst-entrepreneur”. Rothbard enumerates two functions of the business-
owner: (1) entrepreneurial function of uncertainty-bearing and (2) capitalist function of 
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employing the present funds. Rothbard mentions also the managerial function which 
could also be performed by employees. With this third function, the owner earns an 
implicit wage by contributing his labor. This decision-making function involves hiring 
of component managers and the choice of the production process. This function also 
continues in the evenly rotating economy. Since this decision-making function is a 
property of the owner’s personality it is always specific to each firm and cannot be 
hired. Therefore the owner “earns a unique ‘rent of decision-making ability,’ which 
tends to equal the factor’s discounted marginal revenue product”130. Salerno states that 
Rothbard’s observed the difference between the income of the business owner as 
ultimate decision-maker and steward of his property from his income in performing the 
function of a capitalist and an uncertainty bearing entrepreneur. 
 
Salerno concludes that “for someone to be an uncertainty-bearer in the narrow 
entrepreneurial sense, he must incur the incidence of losses, and so he must also be a 
capitalist who invests funds in purchasing factor services in advance of the sale of the 
product on the market”131. The ownership-function also involves some kind of 
supervision of the capital and leads to decisions that have to be made by the capitalist-
entrepreneur. Salerno points out that this fact also has important implications on the 
theory of the firm since the decision-making function implies that the firm is a 
projection of the owner’s personality.  
 
3.7 Conclusion 
In assessing this debate about entrepreneurship in modern economic theory we realize 
that there are many metaphysical, anthropological and ethical questions involved: What 
is the essence of entrepreneurship? Who can be considered as an entrepreneur? Which 
characteristics distinguish an entrepreneur from other actors within the market? What is 
the end of entrepreneurship? How can we cultivate (the virtue of) entrepreneurship? All 
these questions do not deal with the particular classification of a certain action as 
entrepreneurial. They are the translation of the even bigger questions about essence, 
existence and being into a specific economic terminology. Translating these questions 
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back in the original sources where they were inspired from, will help us to understand 
how we can think about them more properly. We will see that the distinction of 
alertness and ownership as possible essences of entrepreneurship are complementary 
and we can find a way in approaching alertness both as ability and action in the same 
way. 
 
Carl Menger, the founder of the Austrian school of economics was heavily influenced 
by Aristotelian thinking. Though later fellows of the Austrian school do not emphasize 
very much this root of their thinking or are not aware of it, we can find it still present 
implicitly. Aristotle’s concepts and arguments will help us to speak in a better way 
about entrepreneurship. His fundamental realist approach is one thing that the above 
mentioned economists have in common. If they speak about entrepreneurship they all 
speak about real products or services and they speak about real profits (whether these 
are psychological and/or monetary). Entrepreneurship is not an idea that can never be 
fully achieved in this world and entrepreneurship is also not only about ideas – 
invention of new products or processes that have no real world application. 
Entrepreneurship is all about bringing new things into existing but not for the sake of 
their mere existence but for the sake of serving other people. Profits are gained because 
other people value the new thing more than they value the input factors. Hence 
entrepreneurship is primarily a social activity and is therefore other-directed or 
altruistic. In Aristotelian terms entrepreneurship matches with two of his fundamental 
principles: philosophy (and especially metaphysics) has to start its investigation from 
actually existing things and man is per se a social being (zoon politikon). (1278b20) 
 
Aristotle divides all actually existing things into two parts: form and matter. (1029a1-3) 
Referring to our discussion about entrepreneurship, alertness seems to deal somehow 
with the Aristotelian form and ownership seems to relate to matter. The form of an 
entrepreneurial act is the idea or the vision how to put together capital to bring 
something new into existence. With Aristotle we can argue that alertness (as the ability 
to perceive this vision of a hitherto unnoticed profit opportunity) is the essence of 
entrepreneurship because he describes in Metaphysics132  that “the form […], or 
                                                 
132 cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics, Sioux Falls 2009 
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whatever we ought to call the shape present in the sensible thing, is not produced, nor is 
there any production of it, nor is the essence produced; for this [Note: form/essence] is 
that which is made to be in something else either by art or by nature or by some faculty” 
(1033a5-8). Though alertness might be essential, it is not sufficient for entrepreneurship 
because it has only to do with the potency of an entrepreneurial act. But for Aristotle 
actuality is prior to potency in formula, substantiality and partially in time. (1049b10-
12) Actuality means always a compounded existence – the combination of form and 
matter. Thus capital is also necessary for an entrepreneurial act and Kirzner’s concept of 
a pure entrepreneur is misleading. Still it is not the ownership or the disposal of capital 
that characterizes an alert person in being an entrepreneur. It is alertness that 
distinguishes capital owners in being an entrepreneur or not. Aristotle puts it in these 
words: “If then a differentia of a differentia be taken at each step, one differentia - the 
last - will be the form […].” (1038a27). Hence we see that also Salerno’s emphasize on 
the capital-owning characteristic of entrepreneurship is not sufficient. 
 
Aristotle also helps us to look at the causes of entrepreneurship in a broader sense. He 
distinguishes the (1) material cause (related to the disposal of capital), (2) the moving 
cause (the entrepreneur himself), (3) the formal cause (alertness), and (4) the final cause 
(profit). (1044a35-1044b3) Entrepreneurial theory speaks explicitly about profits as the 
cause for entrepreneurship but neglects other causes. Particularly the moving cause – 
the entrepreneur himself – is also very important. It is always the individual who moves 
a perceived entrepreneurial opportunity from potency into actuality. The reasons why a 
person decides to give up a higher degree of certainty as employee and to become an 
entrepreneur are manifold. The easy way to argue with utilitarian principles is of course 
always to contend that the amount of pleasure (monetary and non-monetary profit) has 
to be higher in the entrepreneurial environment than in the job situation before. 
Otherwise a rational acting person would not change anything. But this argument has 
the problem that the entrepreneurial act involves time and the preferences and the 
subject perception of pleasure can change over time. A perceived profit opportunity can 
be doubted during the implementation of the new procedure or the new product and can 
in the end still turn out as a real profit opportunity. From a utilitarian point of view this 
kind of entrepreneurship is not possible. 
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Hence we see that we need a broader view of the entrepreneur than a profit or pleasure 
maximizing individual that is only driven by the final cause of exploiting 
entrepreneurial opportunities. Every entrepreneur is a person that has social relations, a 
distinct character and a variety of reasons to become a bearer of genuine uncertainty. As 
Mises points out, he has to be a leader in economic life. Leadership, prestige, a higher 
degree of independence in organizing one’s work life and many other issues play 
important roles in the discernment of becoming an entrepreneur. 
 
Profit in entrepreneurial activity can be compared with Aristotle’s whole that is “other” 
(or frequently quoted as “more”) than its parts. Aristotle uses the example of the 
syllable – ba is not the same as b and a individually. (1041b12) This is also valid for a 
product and its input factors. If the appreciation in the market (price) of the product is 
higher than the prices the entrepreneur has purchased for the input factors, he will gain a 
monetary profit. But he usually doesn’t know during planning and producing if he will 
be able to earn profit since he transforms the essence of the input factors into a whole 
that is other than the input.  
 
Also, it might be revealing in some ways to look at alertness, the ability to perceive 
hitherto unnoticed profit opportunities, as a virtue.133 According to Aristotle’s 
Nicomachean Ethics134 a virtue has to have a predisposition in the human being’s 
character in order to be actualized as virtuous act. He calls this predisposition dynamis – 
the quality of this predisposition varies from individual to individual. Nevertheless 
everybody who has a dynamis for alertness has to actualize this potency by acting 
entrepreneurially – Aristotle calls these acts energeia. This is necessary to create a real 
disposition which Aristotle calls hexis. (1103a27-1103b25) 
 
The economists discussed above observe that there are some agents in the economy that 
act particularly different than others. They are more willing to bear uncertainty, they 
                                                 
133 This cannot be understood fully in the Aristotelian concept of virtue because virtues are not part of 
economic life but of political life. But since the significance of work and production for a person’s life 
and also the formation of his character has changed tremendously over time, this analogy has at least 
some validity. 
134 cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 2009 
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have a greater capacity to create a vision and they are more consistent to turn this vision 
into reality. They all have a natural predisposition of alertness that has to be trained and 
cultivated by entrepreneurial activity and transformed into an actual disposition. 
Entrepreneurs can learn how to make decisions and exploit profit opportunities in 
schools and all kinds of trainings but this is never real entrepreneurial activity. The 
ultimate teachers of entrepreneurship are the consumers; the school, where 
entrepreneurs develop their virtue of alertness, is the market. 
 
The components of alertness are best described by Frank Knight: the ability to forecast 
the future with and without entrepreneurial intervention, the discernment of the best 
way to shape the future state of affairs (a combination of the best profit opportunity and 
the decision on the plan that is most likely to work) and the ability to turn this plan into 
reality. To become an uncertainty-bearer two components of alert entrepreneurial 
activity are necessary: self-confidence and the trust in one’s luck. Entrepreneurs, even 
though they act in an environment of true uncertainty, they usually are highly confident 
that their forecast of the future is correct, that their plan will work, and that in the end 
fortune favors the bold. 
 
If we try to understand the importance of uncertainty for entrepreneurship, we won’t 
find a satisfying answer in Aristotle’s writings. The reason is Aristotle’s concept of time 
that is primarily physical. For him time is a continuum and consists of an indefinite 
number of atomistic points of now. The Greek philosophy could not yet consider the 
subjectivity of the human person and time as a phenomenon that is closely related to the 
human person. If we look at time from an anthropological or ontological perspective, 
we can see that each person has a history that shapes the decisions to respond to the 
uncertainty of the future. Now therefore is not a single point in a continuum like endless 
other points, but is the crossing of two ontological different spheres of time: the past 
and the future. Human action is always motivated by the future though it is at the same 
time shaped by the past. Applying this fact to the branch of human economic activity, 
we can argue that there are different ways in responding to the uncertainty of the future 
and entrepreneurship is the genuine way to bear true uncertainty within the economy. If 
this is the case, we can say further that entrepreneurship has an equilibrating 
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component. A general equilibrium is usually related to certainty about the state of 
affairs. Hence no matter how disequilibrating other factors are, since entrepreneurship 
bears, and therefore reduces, uncertainty it has an equilibrating impact in the economy. 
 
In our assessment of the nature of entrepreneurship, we now have investigated the 
relationship between uncertainty and entrepreneurship. We have explored the different 
components of entrepreneurship and its role within the economy. Before we analyze the 
underlying concept of the human person we will briefly look at the different approaches 
on how entrepreneurship is carried out in the economy. With Aristotle’s view we saw 
that alertness might be a predisposition but it has to be activated. The entrepreneur 
usually needs other people to carry out his plans. This is usually done within a firm. 
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4. Theories of the Firm 
 
The questions we want to investigate in this chapter are: why firms do exist? What is 
the most appropriate explanation for their existence? The theories of the entrepreneur 
take in some ways for granted that the person, who has the ability to forecast and make 
plans in response to an uncertain future, is also able to carry out these plans with the 
help of other people. We will now discuss two influential theories about the existence of 
corporations: Ronald Coase’s rationale of the importance of transaction costs and 
Alchian and Demsetz’s argumentation along shirking costs. We will contrast them with 
an entrepreneurial theory of the firm that corresponds with the main arguments we 
found for characterizing an entrepreneur. 
 
4.1 Transaction Costs (Coase) 
Ronald Coase who was a professor for Law and Economics at the University of 
Chicago has been awarded the Nobel Prize in economics, among other achievements, 
for his work in exploring the nature of the firm. In the homonymous essay he published 
in 1937 he develops the theory of transaction costs that are the cause for the existence 
and the size of firms – if there were no transaction costs, no firms would exist. 
 
Coase starts his investigation with the common understanding of the market at his time: 
prices have a coordinating function to allocate scarce resources efficiently. This fact is 
the main argument against central economic planning for society. But Coase also 
observes that, as a matter of fact, economic planning in society exists. Within a firm 
there is no automatic process like in the market and workmen are not responding to 
changes in supply and demand but rather following orders. Every individual makes his 
own plans in response to an uncertain future. The economic planning of an entrepreneur 
within a firm is a different kind of economic planning which is still again different from 
economic planning of the whole society. This form of planning is organized in a way 
that Coase, by quoting Joan Robinson, describes as “islands of conscious power in this 
ocean of unconscious co-operation like lumps of butter coagulating in a pail of 
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buttermilk”135. Within the firm the complex structure of the market coordinated by the 
prize system is substituted by the coordinator-entrepreneur who is carrying out his plans 
and is directing production. 
 
Ronald Coase assumes establishing a firm has to be more profitable compared to 
carrying out the plan in the market economy by the price mechanism. The main reason 
he introduces, why firms are more efficient is that “there is a cost of using the price 
mechanism”136. He points out, there are two kinds of these costs in the market that can 
be reduced but cannot be eliminated: (1) Discovering the relevant prices, (2) negotiating 
and concluding a separate contract for each exchange transaction. It is especially the 
costs of contracts of the factors of production with each other that makes substitution of 
this series of contracts with one contractor more efficient. Also, the option to sign 
contracts for longer periods is cheaper than signing several contracts for short periods. 
Coase points out that also measures like a sales tax provide incentives rather to organize 
production within a firm than on the market. For already existing corporations, these 
policies tend to increase the size of the business. 
 
Coase rejects Frank Knight’s explanation for the existence of a firm. Contracts can be 
designed in a way that the coordinator-entrepreneur bears no uncertainty but has fixed 
prices for his service while the payment of his employees may be wholly a share in his 
profits. Coase also deals with the question of the size of a firm which would not be able 
on a Knightean understanding.137 He assumes that the limit of the size of a firm is 
determined by the point where the costs of organizing an extra transaction are equal to 
the costs of carrying out the transaction in the open market. Coase defines three 
characteristics for a larger size of the firm: (1) the less the costs of organizing are 
(managerial improvements, new communication means, bringing factors of production 
closer together), (2) the less likely the entrepreneur makes mistakes and (3) the greater 
the lowering in supply price of factors of production is. To determine the size of the 
firm, we have to consider marketing costs (using the price mechanism) and costs of 
organizing of different entrepreneurs. 
                                                 
135 Ronald Coase, “The Nature of the Firm” in Economia 1937, p. 388 
136 Coase, “The Nature of the Firm”, 1937, p. 390 
137 cf. Coase, “The Nature of the Firm”, 1937, pp. 394 et seqq. 
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4.2 Shirking Costs (Alchian & Demsetz) 
Ronald Coase’s theory of the firm was challenged in 1972 by two economists from 
UCLA, Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz, with their article Production, Information 
Costs and Economic Organization. They settle their theory of the firm on the fact that 
men engaged in team-production have a natural inclination to shirk and burden more of 
their share of the work on their cooperator’s shoulders. Hence, the necessity arises to 
meter inputs and outputs. 
 
They challenge specifically Coase’s transaction costs argument in exploring the nature 
of contracts and pointing out that there is no difference between a contract within the 
firm and on the market. The only punishments, available for an underperforming 
employee, is withholding future salary or suing for the bad performance. There are 
exactly the same options available on the product market if the seller is doing a bad job 
or is delivering bad quality. In Alchian and Demsetz’s view only the fact of team 
production within a firm distinguishes it from operations on the market coordinated by 
prices. To illustrate their view they refer to the case of two men jointly lifting a heavy 
cargo – we cannot determine the marginal productivity of each of them. The output is 
not a composition of several individual outcomes but it is a sum that cannot be achieved 
if the work would have been performed individually (one man would not be able to lift 
the heavy cargo alone).138 
 
Alchian and Demsetz presuppose a utility-maximizing individual who is involved in 
team production. The utility function of this individual is stimulated by an increase in 
income and in leisure. Since there is a higher incentive for the individual in team 
production to buy more leisure and the relaxation cannot be detected by zero costs, his 
shirking will be borne by others in the team. This incentive exists for all individuals 
involved in team production. Alchian and Demsetz’s theory of the firm wants to find a 
way how to meter especially these inputs to increase the output of team production. 
 
                                                 
138 cf. Armin Alchian/Harold Demsetz, “Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization” in 
The American Economic Review 1962, p. 779 
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The market process would monitor some shirking activities but even better would be to 
hire a monitor. But who will monitor the monitor? The monitor could have a higher 
incentive in not to shirk as a monitor if his income is related to the net earnings of the 
team production. Monitoring includes a variety of activities – like the authority to 
terminate or revise contracts. Alchian and Demsetz refer to the example of a football 
team to distinguish the different functions within a firm. They call the coach a 
supervisor-manager and the team captain an inspector-steward. The main reason for the 
existence of firms is not the costs for establishing contracts (like Coase pointed out) but 
the monitoring of team members and therefore increasing productivity. “Managing or 
examining the ways which inputs are used in team production is a method of metering 
the marginal productivity of individual inputs to the team’s output.”139 The 
entrepreneur/owner of the firm is defined by a bundle of rights: 1) to be a residual 
claimant; 2) to observe input behavior; 3) to be the central party common to all 
contracts with input; 4) to alter the membership of the team; and 5) to sell these rights. 
 
Team production can be realized in different types of firms. Alchian and Demsetz 
distinguish six different types140: (1) The Profit-Sharing Firms can work efficiently with 
small groups of partners, (2) Socialist Firms let the employees participate in the residual 
to a high degree and therefore increase the incentive for shirking of the manager 
(because his share of the residual is limited), (3) the Corporation sells promises for 
future returns to those who provide financial capital, hence many risk-averse investors 
contribute small portions and are excluded from everyday decision making by the 
concept of limited liability. The effective control of corporate activity is achieved by a 
smaller group, the managerial board. The policing of managerial shirking is executed by 
market forces by external and internal labor markets and voting blocs of share holders 
who are blocking their decision power in order to remove shirking managing boards. (4) 
In Mutual and Nonprofit Firms more shirking is to be expected, (5) Partnerships will be 
established for production in artistic or professional intellectual skills and will occur 
more likely between long-term acquaintances who are not only fulfilling a utility-
                                                 
139 Alchian/Demsetz, “Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization”, 1962, p. 782 
140 Alchian/Demsetz, “Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization”, 1962, pp. 785 et 
seqq. 
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function. (6) Employee Unions act as monitor for employees and meter employer 
performances especially in non-pecuniary benefits. 
 
4.3 Uncertainty (Knight)  
Knight’s rationale for the existence of firms is again genuine uncertainty. The 
entrepreneur handles uncertainty while the consumer is only confronted by risk. If real 
change takes place, pure reasoning is not able to deal with it. For Knight entrepreneurial 
judgment cannot be sold and bought. The judgment of an entrepreneur is required to be 
exercised and is therefore involving liability to error. This responsibility for the 
correctness of his opinion becomes a condition prerequisite in order to getting others to 
submit to the entrepreneur’s control. For Knight the functions of responsibility and 
control are inseparable combined in the function of the entrepreneur. Judgment and the 
exercise of this judgment by the entrepreneur by submitting others to his control are part 
of the distinct nature and origin of the firm in Frank Knight’s view. 
 
It is this confidence in his judgment, the ability to carry it out and his luck that generate 
the income through an enterprise for the entrepreneur. This income is characterized by 
Knight in two different forms: 
With the specialization of function goes also a differentiation of reward. The produce of 
society is similarly divided into two kinds of income, and two only, contractual income, 
which is essentially rent, as economic theory has described incomes, and residual income 
or profit.141 
 
For Knight, this residual income is a combination of two elements: an element of 
calculation and an element of luck. But the income of the entrepreneur is not determined 
like wages are usually determined – it is what is left after the others are determined. 
There are three reasons why the profit of an entrepreneur tends to be larger: (1) his 
special ability to forecast the future and to carry out his plan, (2) his good luck in doing 
so, and (3) regarding society, the scarcity of self-confidence combined with the power 
to make effective guarantees to employees. 
 
                                                 
141 Knight, Risk, Uncertainty and Profit, 2006, p. 271 
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4.4 Alertness (Kirzner) 
Kirzner assumes, the firm is not the same as the pure entrepreneur but something that 
emerges after the entrepreneur has made decisions, specifically the purchase of certain 
resources. He thinks that conventional theories of the firm which assume, decisions 
within the firm are made in order to maximize profits, contribute to the 
misunderstanding that maximization of profits is not related to entrepreneurship but to 
ownership. 
 
In his assessment of the modern corporate firm, Kirzner ignores the legal façade and 
identifies two economic categories: (a) capitalists and (b) entrepreneurs.142 He considers 
bondholders and stockholders143 as capitalists. But entrepreneurship is related to those 
who have the vision and alertness to exploit hitherto unnoticed profit opportunities. To 
explore the entrepreneurial function within the corporate firm Kirzner uses a simple, 
hypothetical example of an owner of a gun (person A) who hires a hunter (person B). B 
employs his skills as a hunter and the revenues from his hunting surpass the costs of the 
gun and his wage. In this case A, who earns the pure profits because he was alert of B’s 
hunting skills, performs the pure entrepreneurial function. If A is not alert of the 
hitherto unnoticed profit opportunities and puts his gun to work simply in an ordinary 
way, he will earn no entrepreneurial profit. If B, by behaving unethically, is exploiting 
the profit opportunities by himself, uses the gun from A, he will gain entrepreneurial 
profit. Now B is the one who is alert and therefore performs the entrepreneurial function 
– in both cases, no matter who owns the resources, the profit goes to the entrepreneur.144 
 
Kirzner relates this example to the modern corporate firm – with A being the 
shareholders who provide the capital (gun) and B being the managers who run the 
business (hunting). Depending on the decision-making process within the firm, the 
entrepreneurial profit goes either to the shareholders if they can organize themselves 
and employ their alertness by controlling the managers or it goes to the managers 
because the shareholders stay ignorant to the unexploited profit opportunities. But this 
                                                 
142 cf. Kirzner, Competition & Entrepreneurship, 1973, p. 55 
143 Though the stockholder also owns part of the corporation he is mainly providing capital. The 
stockholder does not receive profits from his share but an implicit interest, a quasi-rent. 
144 cf. Kirzner, Competition & Entrepreneurship, 1973, pp. 57 et seqq. 
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observation puts the general profit-maximization of the corporate firm in trouble 
because it is not the decisions within the firm which have a profit-maximizing function. 
It is the decisions of individuals that perform this function and therefore are the residual 
claimant. 
 
4.5 Contemporary Entrepreneurial Theories of the Firm 
Kirzner tried to deliver a complete theory of the entrepreneur and the nature of 
entrepreneurial activity. He did not pay so much attention on the theory of the firm but 
inspired other fellows of the Austrian school of economics to develop his ideas into 
more detailed entrepreneurial arguments for the existence of firms. Frédéric Sautet 
argues that firms exist because otherwise profit opportunities could not be exploited. 
The Knightean approach of uncertainty is considered by Nicholas Dew, S. Ramakrishna 
Velamuri and Sankaran Venkataraman. New firms are established if the intersubjective 
agreement on profit opportunity in the market is higher than within the existing firm. An 
entrepreneur becomes a bearer of true Knightean uncertainty if the intersubjective 
agreement on the profit opportunity is low both within and outside the firm. Nicolaj 
Foss and Peter Klein focus on Knight’s theory of judgment as essential for 
entrepreneurship within the firm. 
 
Exploitability thesis 
Frédéric Sautet assesses existing theories of the firm and wants to complete their 
approaches with a particular entrepreneurial theory. His theory emphasizes that a firm is 
not only a solution to a problem of costs, but also one to the problem of true ignorance 
and coordination. A transaction costs explanation for the firm is sufficient for a market 
that is constantly in equilibrium. In this state, the emergence of new firms is only related 
to exogenous phenomena. The entrepreneurial theory puts the promoter and his vision 
how the future could look like in the center of its theory and therefore provides an 
endogenous explanation for the emergence of new firms. There is also a social 
dimension present in the entrepreneurial theory because the entrepreneur-promoter 
relies on entrepreneurial insights of other individuals. Oftentimes the theory of the firm 
is reduced to a mere cost-benefit analysis. But the entrepreneur-promoter cannot buy 
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what is not part of his means-ends-framework. He is the driving force in the economy – 
no markets exist if there are no entrepreneurs. 
 
Sautet states that innovation always involves arbitrage. He distinguishes between 
entrepreneurship type I which is atemporal arbitrage and does not involve production 
and type II which is intertemporal and involves production (and innovation). According 
to Kirzner, entrepreneurship and the market process have a tendency to equilibrium. But 
of course there is the possibility of failure. Sautet observes three types of mistakes:145 
(1) missed opportunity – something could have been done but wasn’t. If pure 
subjectivism is applied such a failure does not exist – only if we presuppose an 
objective reality this kind of mistake matters. (2) Spurious discovery – entrepreneur acts 
as if, but there was no opportunity or part of the market data was read wrongly – 
something can be discovered but not as much as the entrepreneur thought. This failure is 
systematically eliminated over time through experience. (3) Rivalry – someone steps in 
to exploit the discovered opportunity; someone realizes a profit opportunity by raising 
resource prices. Thus, someone had the necessary alertness for discovering the profit 
opportunity but not the necessary ability to exploit it. 
 
If firms don’t exist, profit opportunities cannot be exploited (unexploitability thesis). 
The planner must be able to set up long term contracts and to secure resources for the 
duration of the plan. Otherwise production and, hence, entrepreneurship type II cannot 
take place. Sautet calls this entrepreneur who supersedes the price mechanism with long 
term contracts to exploit discovered profit opportunities entrepreneur-promoter 
(following Mises’ terminology). This entrepreneur-promoter uses factor inputs that will 
become specific over time to carry out his plan. He needs to convince resource owners 
of his superior foresight. This requires some kind of alertness of the resource owners as 
well and they also engage in an entrepreneurial gamble. Therefore, the emergence of the 
firm can be seen as the simultaneous exploitation of profits by different entrepreneurs – 
most of them are within the firm (as employees) some are outside and provide assets. 
Sautet gives the following definition of the firm: 
                                                 
145 Sautet, An Entrepreneurial Theory of the Firm, 2000, pp. 64 et seqq. 
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The firm is a non-price planned coordination over time between complementary inputs in 
which market errors due to the ignorance of other individuals’ plans do not exist. The 
entrepreneur-promoter coordinates all these inputs. […] The firm is an island of planning 
and it serves as the locus of exploitation of a discovered profit.146 
 
The firm is not only a matter of profit exploitation but also one of coordination that 
cannot be achieved other than within a firm. Factors of production that have rendered 
their alertness are now following the plan of the entrepreneur-promoter. Sautet’s 
entrepreneurial theory of the firm is distinguished from a resource-based approach in 
such a way that not rents are the driving force for the emergence of a firm but pure 
profits. 
 
Sautet thinks that this concept of the firm also could be a solution to the lachmannian 
problem147: He states that in the market a certain degree of order exists – therefore 
ordering forces must exist in the market system. The emergence of firms is such a force 
– entrepreneurial alertness is aligned along one vector: that of the promoter. By 
committing resources to the exploitation, promoters create islands of stability and order 
within the market. The only cost of this process is that some opportunities will never be 
exploited because the resources are not available. Firms provide some answers to the 
Lachmannian problem but they do not move the economy to a final state of rest. Sautet 
links firms as an institution in which certain division and combination of knowledge 
takes place and which are necessary to the existence of plan coordination among 
individuals like money or property rights. 
 
Sautet also tries to answer the question what the distinctive nature of the firm is. Since 
there are many theorists who think that there is no specific difference between the firm 
and the market, Sautet uses Hayek’s argument that people are ends-connected within a 
firm whereas they are means-connected within the market – plans are discoordinated 
within the market but they are coordinated within the firm. Within the firm there is also 
a certain hierarchy existing as a reflection of the fact that individuals are pursuing a 
common purpose. 
                                                 
146 Sautet, An Entrepreneurial Theory of the Firm, 2000, p.76 
147 As discussed above, Lachmann employs the theory of a kaleidic society and argues that within the 
market there is no tendency towards equilibrium is present. 
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Dispersed Knowledge 
An article published in 2003 by Nicholas Dew, S. Ramakrishna Velamuri and Sankaran 
Venkataraman explores the theory of the firm due to dispersion of knowledge over 
people and places which leads to uncertainty over time. They want to answer when and 
why new firms are chosen to exploit profit opportunities and when and why an existing 
firm is preferred for marketing an entrepreneurial opportunity. They do not believe that 
costs determine if a transaction is carried out on the market or within a firm. Contrary to 
other theories of the firm, they argue that the emergence of a new firm depends on 
whether an entrepreneur is able or not to sell his recognized opportunity on the market. 
 
The article distinguishes between (1) Akerlofian information asymmetry as cross-
sectional uncertainty which expresses the unequal distribution of existing knowledge 
and (2) Knightian uncertainty as longitudinal uncertainty describing knowledge relevant 
to future predictions that is not simply unknown but unknowable. Its core aspect is the 
genuine lack of predictability owing to the production of novelty. In neoclassical 
concepts of uncertainty the agent – according to Langlois – has perfect structural 
knowledge but imperfect parametric knowledge which implicitly presumes that the 
agent has an exhaustive list of possible actions.148 
 
The dispersion of knowledge and Knightian uncertainty lead to a phenomenon that is 
called heterogeneous expectations. This means, different people have different 
expectations. The article points out four rationales why expectations are heterogeneous: 
(1) They are an imaginative faculty, subjectively held and therefore not observable. (2) 
Much of the knowledge people have is tacit and dependent on different physical and 
mental capabilities. (3) Costs are subjectively perceived and as opportunity costs 
depending on what the decision-maker sacrifices when he selects an alternative. (4) 
Expectations are notoriously volatile and are constantly modified as the result of past 
actions.149 
                                                 
148 cf. Nicholas Dewa/S. Ramakrishna Velamurib/Sankaran Venkataraman, “Dispersed knowledge and an 
entrepreneurial theory of the firm” in Journal of Business Venturing 2004, pp.664 et seq. 
149 cf. Nicholas Dewa, et al., “Dispersed knowledge and an entrepreneurial theory of the firm”, 2004, pp. 
667 et seq. 
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In exploring the existing theories of the firm the article examines the transaction cost 
theory originated by Ronald Coase. There are two types of contracts in the market: 
specific and residual contracts. Knightian uncertainty cannot be covered by specific 
contracts. The entrepreneur is the residual contract holder and makes judgment in 
situations of true uncertainty which is not contractible again on the market. “The 
creation of a firm is […] an entrepreneurial response to the absence of a market for the 
entrepreneur’s service.”150 
 
In product markets, the degree of uncertainty is related to the likelihood that an 
opportunity cannot be transacted in the market. If factor markets for the entrepreneur do 
not exist, he has to turn to nonmarket solutions with family and friends to generate a 
positive outcome for the venture. If a reasonable intersubjective agreement about the 
profit opportunity and its value exists, the opportunity can also be sold. The 
entrepreneur can use patents. 
 
The article investigates the likelihood of entrepreneurial opportunities exploited within 
an existing firm. This depends on the intersubjective agreement especially among the 
key persons within the firm. Since intersubjective agreement in this article is linked to 
uncertainty – the less intersubjective agreement the higher the uncertainty of an 
opportunity – there is a positive relation between the uncertainty of an opportunity and 
the likelihood of being exploited in a new firm. Opportunities with a high degree of 
uncertainty are called “individual-centric” because they only exist in the mind of the 
individual. The article distinguishes four scenarios: (1) high intersubjective agreement 
on the value of the opportunity both within and outside the firm: The opportunity is very 
obvious and has kind of an objective status – transaction cost theory plays an important 
role in the analysis if a certain opportunity will be exploited within the existing firm or 
in a new firm. (2) The intersubjective agreement is high within the firm and low outside 
(through an information asymmetry): The opportunity will be exploited within the 
existing firm. (3) If the intersubjective agreement is high outside the firm and low 
inside, a new firm will be established and if (4) intersubjective agreement is low both 
                                                 
150 Nicholas Dewa, et al., “Dispersed knowledge and an entrepreneurial theory of the firm”, 2004,  p. 670 
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within the firm and outside we face a situation of true Knightian uncertainty. A 
“bootstrapping” approach (use of family and friends for resources) in this scenario is 
very likely.151 
 
The article concludes that existing theories of the firm provide justification for the 
existence of firms, but they do not explain how firms come into existence. These 
theories also overlook the important role of particular individuals for the creation of 
firms and markets. And lastly especially in the firm as a contractual structure, due to 
Knightian uncertainty contracts are not only incomplete but incompletable.152 
 
Judgment 
Nicolaj Foss and Peter Klein in 2004 developed a theory of the firm that is based on the 
concept of entrepreneurship as judgment. The entrepreneur needs a firm because 
judgment cannot be purchased on the market. In their approach, the entrepreneur 
envisions new assets to use in order to produce final goods. These resource uses are not 
mere data but are created by the entrepreneur. In their assessment they address the 
fundamental questions how an entrepreneur is connected with an enterprise and how 
economic theory is describing this relationship. They believe that concepts of 
entrepreneurship as management, creativity, innovation, alertness, or charismatic 
leadership, though they crucial aspects, do not provide a sufficient rationale to 
understand the concept of the entrepreneur. These theories lack answers to the questions 
why the entrepreneur has a special function within the firm and why he needs a firm in 
order to be an entrepreneur. 
 
Entrepreneurship as judgment has answers to these questions. Judgment is the formation 
of estimates “of future events in situations in which there is no agreement or idea at all 
on probabilities of occurrence.”153 Judgment implies ownership because judgmental 
decision-making is decision-making about the employment of resources. But judgment 
                                                 
151 Nicholas Dewa, et al., “Dispersed knowledge and an entrepreneurial theory of the firm”, 2004, pp.672 
et seqq. 
152 There is a debate about incomplete contracts in the line of transaction cost theory of the firm but this 
does not contribute any additional information at this point. We leave it therefore with this statement. 
153 Nicolai J. Foss/Peter G. Klein, Entrepreneurship and the Economic Theory of the Firm: Any Gains 
from Trade? DRUID Working Paper No 04-12, p. 8 
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also implies some sort of control of the resources. This is especially linked to contract 
theories of the firm and the theories of incomplete contracts from organizational 
economics. The contracts between the entrepreneur and his employees are incomplete 
due to the uncertainty of the future. 
 
The necessity of ownership of assets for an entrepreneur is linked to the perception of 
attributes. If we consider the heterogeneity of capital we can observe that almost all 
assets have multiple attributes. Attributes also may vary over time in a world of “true” 
uncertainty and so the entrepreneur cannot know all attributes of the assets employed 
when he makes the decisions for production. These future attributes of assets cannot be 
forecasted with certainty. 
 
The combination of uncertainty, incomplete contracts and the employment of assets is 
the basis for Klein’s and Foss’ entrepreneurial theory of the firm. Entrepreneurship is 
not only the initial invention, the new combination. It is also not only the alertness about 
unnoticed profit opportunities. The entrepreneur, by carrying out his judgment through 
the employment of capital and by hiring employees, discovers continuously new 
attributes of the assets he has employed. He creates by envisioning new ways of using 
his assets to produce goods and provide services. He is able to do so because he is the 
owner of these assets (or has at least the rights that are usually related to ownership) and 
because contracts with his employees are incomplete and he has the right to control their 
work in such a way that he is able to employ their working force in different ways of 
carrying out his new plans. 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
We want to apply again some basic principles of Aristotelian philosophy in order to get 
a better understanding of the arguments that were used in this discussion on the nature 
of the firm. In Politics154 Aristotle describes man as zoon politikon, as political being 
that is driven into community. (1278b20) While the goal of the political community is 
the virtuousness of its citizens we could look at the catallaxy – the economic 
community in the same way. Alertness is the virtue that is fostered by the market and 
                                                 
154 Aristotle, Politics, Mineola 2000 
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puts the natural leaders at the forefront. Among man there are some that have a special 
ability to recognize the deficiencies of other people, to envision ways to balance them 
and to carry out these visions. They are leaders in the economic community. Their 
special ability (alertness) is a necessary component for being a leader in the economic 
sphere, an entrepreneur, a promoter. In order to recognize an action as entrepreneurial, 
this action must also be turned into reality. This requires to make a judgment and to 
carry out this judgment. 
 
Judgment is not a purely individualistic decision of a single person independent from 
his environment. Man is a social being and being in the world for him always means 
being in community. Carrying out of the judgment always has community as a 
prerequisite. He perceives the objective reality and judges in which way he wants to 
carry out what he observed to be useful to man. If there is some sort of intersubjective 
agreement on the usefulness of his observation, he will find means and ways to carry 
out his judgment – either within his existing firm or with support of a new firm. He is 
able to start a new firm because the usefulness of his observation is in some regards 
obvious. But if he is the only one who sees the potential of his observation and if he 
really believes in this observation, is courageous and has also some good luck, he can 
become a “real” leader in the economy. 
 
Since entrepreneurship always involves time and the employment of resources or labor 
(and even if it is just the labor of the entrepreneur) we cannot agree with any idealistic 
concept of entrepreneurship. Two crucial facts distinguish the entrepreneur within the 
firm from other functions: (1) He receives the residual income and (2) he is the holder 
of residual contracts. This means that he is responsible not only for carrying out a 
judgment but also the soundness of his forecast of future demands. Since 
entrepreneurship takes place in time and the future is uncertain and also it is uncertain if 
the entrepreneur knows all attributes of the assets that he employs, it is necessary that 
the contracts are incomplete and he has the power to readjust the working forces he has 
hired. Entrepreneurship is not an initial judgmental decision and a mechanic process 
that is followed, but it is an ongoing creation of new visions, making of new judgments 
and carrying out of these judgments. 
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The execution of his judgment is of course part of the entrepreneurial act. This involves 
dealing with contract costs and also some managerial work in order to prevent 
tendencies of shirking among the employees. With the theory of the firm we can see that 
there are many issues involved regarding entrepreneurship. If entrepreneurship as a 
combination of alertness, judgment and execution is the virtue of appropriately 
forecasting and meeting future human wants, it has to enacted through and with a firm.  
 
After this investigation of the nature of entrepreneurship and the nature of the firm, we 
now turn back to our initial questions about human nature in general. We will discuss 
the anthropological concepts of methodological individualism and economic 
personalism. We will see how well they serve for developing an understanding of the 
human person in the economy and how they are related to the discussed topics of 
entrepreneurship. 
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5. Methodological Individualism 
 
The concept of individualism in economic theory has a long tradition and is rooted back 
in the emergence of the classical science of economics with Adam Smith and his 
contemporaries in the 18th century.155 There are many different strands of individualism: 
political, philosophical, anthropological and many more. Hayek distinguishes two main 
concepts of individualism relevant for economics: true (irrational) and false (rational) 
individualism.156 These belong mainly to the Scottish tradition of philosophers and 
economists on the one hand and to French philosophers on the other hand. Both schools 
of thoughts have an integrated concept of individualism. 
 
Carl Menger, as the founder of the Austrian School of Economics, was the first to 
describe the scientific method that became a foundation for the Austrian approach to 
economics as theoretical science. The term methodological individualism that is widely 
known as the methodological basis was first coined by Joseph Schumpeter in his 
publication, Das Wesen und der Hauptinhalt der theorethischen Nationalökonomie. 
There is no authorized translation for this early work of Schumpeter and F. A. v. Hayek 
suggests in a preface for a translation by Michiel van Notten in 1980 that the reluctance 
of Schumpeter to translate and distribute, it was due to some views he expounded that 
he later did not believe any more. In Hayek’s view Schumpeter shifted gradually away 
from the Austrian School of economics by turning to the teachings of Leon Walras, 
focusing more on macro-economics and becoming one of the co-founders of the 
econometric movement.157 Though Joseph Schumpeter later had quite different opinions 
about a sound methodological approach to economics it is still worth exploring his early 
thoughts that clearly show the influence of his teachers Carl Menger and Eugen v. 
                                                 
155 There is a debate especially among fellows of the contemporary Austrian school of economics going 
on when the modern science of economics was established. Carl Menger was the first studying the 
writings of the Doctors of the famous School of Salamanca that have already extensively studied 
economic phenomena and developed the theory of subjective value in the 15th and 16th which has been 
neglected afterwards until the end of the 19th century. Joseph Schumpeter went further and traced the 
‘philosophic’ strand in economics in Economic Method and Doctrine (Chap. 1) back to Plato and 
Aristotle.  
156 cf. Friedrich A. Hayek, “Individualism: True and False” in Individualism and Economic Order, 
Chicago, London 1948 
157 cf. Friedrich A. v. Hayek: “Preface”, in Joseph Schumpeter, Methodological Individualism, Bruxelles 
1980 
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Böhm-Bawerk and give a sound definition of the concept of methodological 
individualism. 
 
5.1 Economic Processes in Close Limits (Schumpeter) 
Joseph Schumpeter’s writings on individualism were also influenced by Max Weber,158 
who contributed a theory of methodological individualism to social sciences in general. 
At the age of 25 years Schumpeter published his first work on economics Das Wesen 
und der Hauptinhalt der theorethischen Nationalökonomie. He dedicated chapter VI to 
a more profound exploration of the concept of methodological individualism. There he 
distinguishes political individualism strictly from individualistic science. While the 
“former starts from the general assumption that freedom more than anything, 
contributes to the development of the individual and the well-being of the society as a 
whole […] the latter […] has no specific propositions and no prerequisites.”159 
Schumpeter wants to limit the concept to the question of whether the individual can be 
the basis for economic inquiry; socialists as well as political individualists can answer 
this question because it is purely methodological. 
 
Schumpeter defends his assumptions mainly against modern economic theory (the 
German historical school). He considers three objections to his theory160: (1) the 
national economist and the social politician are in many cases one and the same person, 
hence focusing only on theoretical problems is not possible; (2) “erreure individualiste” 
developed from biology – the individual cannot live alone but is part of his social 
environment; and (3) the use of the concept of society and social value in pure theory. 
Schumpeter responds that the nature of economics – “what economics really is […] is 
unimportant” and he proposes rather “to concentrate only on the end-result that we want 
to achieve, which in this particular case is the price phenomena.”161 
 
Methodological individualism makes no attempt to be philosophically speculative or to 
create a future ideal. The theory doesn’t aim to state any fact or consider each concrete 
                                                 
158 cf. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Methodological Individualísm,  
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/methodological-individualism/, visited March 6th 2010 
159 Joseph Schumpeter, Methodological Individualism, Bruxelles 1980, p. 3  
160 cf. Schumpeter, Methodological Individualism, 1980, p. 4 
161 Schumpeter, Methodological Individualism, 1980, p. 5 
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action of an individual. The theory intends to describe economic processes within very 
close limits and produce quick and fairly acceptable results. The alternative of a social-
oriented concept in the pure theory would not give any greater advantages and is in 
Schumpeter’s opinion therefore unnecessary. He also refers to the “Robinson”-method 
of classical economics162 as ill-reputed because this creates an image of atomism in 
economics that is certainly not the underlying principle of methodological 
individualism. Schumpeter states, in regard to his analysis of methodological 
individualism, “We have not solved a problem but we have proved in fact that the 
problem did not need to be solved.”163 
 
Of particular interest is Schumpeter’s rejection of terms such as “national income,” 
“national wealth” and “social capital” for methodological reasons. These are collectivist 
interpretations (which played a major role in the German historic tradition) and are now 
well known and frequently used concepts in econometrics. He also explains terms such 
as “total demand” and “total supply” as “combinations of individual processes”164. We 
can observe that Schumpeter in his early writings is clearly influenced by the tradition 
of Austrian Economics and his teachers Menger und Böhm-Bawerk, especially in the 
emphasis on the individual as the origin of every economic phenomenon. These basic 
assumptions of methodological individualism define the scope of the theory and draw 
particular attention on its limits. One of the main questions that will later divide neo-
classical theory (including the Chicago School of Economics and also the later 
Schumpeter approach) and the Austrian School will be whether mathematics and 
statistics provide an appropriate language to assess human behavior and whether human 
action is by definition rational. The Austrians negate uniformly the first question but are 
indifferent on the second. 
 
5.2 All Actions are Performed by Individuals (Mises) 
In Schumpeter’s early writings one could already read some roots of his later shift in 
economic theory. Ludwig v. Mises is much clearer in his argumentation in Human 
                                                 
162 By „Robinson“-method he refers to the approach of classical economic theory to explain economic 
problems starting with the assumption of Robinson Crusoe living together with his companion Friday on 
a lonely island and starting economic activity through production and voluntarily exchange. 
163 Schumpeter, Methodological Individualism, 1980, p. 6 
164 Schumpeter, Methodological Individualism, 1980, p. 8 
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Action. In Chapter II.4 he adumbrates his methodological basis. His focus shifts from 
the individual as such to human action and he states clearly “that all actions are 
performed by individuals”165. He defends methodological individualism against the 
attacks of various metaphysical schools. Like Schumpeter he takes an approach against 
the “nominalistic fallacy” argument stating that it is inappropriate to use the notions of 
scholasticism and apply the antagonism of nominalism and realism to economic theory. 
 
Mises argues against the assumption that the whole (society) might be temporarily and 
logically prior to the part (individual) and that logically the notions of a whole and its 
parts are correlative. As logical concepts they are both apart from time. And even 
against the statement that man who thinks and acts emerges from his prehuman 
existence already as a social being, Mises still insists that all these processes occurred in 
individuals. He goes on with his argument against modern psychology and points out 
that whether a crowd is a gathering, a mass, an organized body or something else, 
depends upon the meaning the people attach to themselves. He rejects the notion that 
our senses make us recognize social entities – rather, it is understanding, a mental 
process, that enables us to do so. 
 
Mises’ praxeology is concerned primarily with the acting ego that is beyond any doubt. 
He can be considered as an atomist for the following two reasons: (1) the only fact that 
has any meaning in his inquiry is the fact that humans act and that the economist can 
derive some general principles from this fact. Therefore, only human action in its 
categorical structure is considered – all other accidental and environmental features of 
human action are the task of history. (2) Human life and existence are atomistic in the 
sense that is the an unceasing sequence of single actions.166 
 
But he is not only an atomist but above all a rationalist. Compared, for example, to F.A. 
v. Hayek, he chooses a quite different assessment of human action. Human action 
according to Mises is by definition rational.167 There is no action that could be called 
irrational for one would not call this behavior action. Action always means that specific 
                                                 
165 Ludwig von Mises, Human Action: A Treatise on Economics, San Francisco 1996, p. 42 
166 cf. von Mises, Human Action, 1996, p. 45 
167 cf. von Mises, Human Action, 1996, p. 19 
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means are applied to achieve certain ends (only known168 by the individual). So the 
science of economics is not concerned with ends but with the process of applying 
means. But in Mises’ terminology the concept of rationality loses its original meaning 
because there is by definition no irrationality in the science of economics. 
 
On the other hand, Mises admits that action is by no means isolated. Every action has 
two aspects: (1) partial action in the framework of a further-stretching action and (2) a 
whole in itself. For praxeology, the further reaching goal can only be achieved step by 
step, action by action (the procedure for building a cathedral is to lay one stone on 
another one).169 This is the rationale why, although there exist chains of actions, the 
only thing that is important for economics is singular human action performed by the 
individual. 
 
5.3 True, False and Methodological Individualism (Hayek) 
Friedrich August v. Hayek does not distinguishes between individualism as a method 
and as a political concept. He wants to trace the method he applies for economics backto 
its philosophical origin. Therefore he points out that although many definitions for 
individualism exist, there are two main concepts of individualism in the history of ideas: 
(1) True individualism, which is related in the 17th and 18th century to John Locke, 
Bernard Mandeville, David Hume, Adam Ferguson, Adam Smith and, for Hayek, 
Edmund Burke in particular. Two of the teachers who were highly influential on 
Hayek’s thought and who developed the ideas of true individualism further in the 18th 
century were Alexis de Tocqueville and Lord Acton. Hayek indicates in a footnote that 
the term individualism first was introduced to the English language by a translation of 
Tocqueville’s Democracy in America where the great French philosopher defined it as 
an attitude to withdraw from society and therefore rejected it.170 (2) False individualism 
                                                 
168 The individual does not consciously know his ends rather the ends just exist and the individual acts 
according to them. For Mises the process of choosing and changing ends and the analysis thereof belongs 
to psychology and is not the subject of economics. Human action is ultimately given – homo sapiens is 
also homo agens – and ends are always given as well. If there are no ends, there is no human action and 
therefore there is either no human existence or the fullest degree of human existence where no desires and 
ends exist anymore. The ancient Greeks called this state perfect happiness. 
169 cf. von Mises, Human Action, 1996, p. 45 
170 cf. Friedrich A. Hayek, “Individualism: True and False” in Individualism and Economic Order, 
Chicago, London 1948 p.5 
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is rooted in the teachings of Cartesian rationalism and is mainly represented by French 
philosophers such as Rousseau and other continental thinkers. Hayek coins the concept 
‘false individualism’ because he is convinced that this rationalistic form of 
individualism always tends to develop into socialism or collectivism. 
 
False Individualism 
Hayek traces the ideas he calls false individualism back to the French tradition founded 
by René Descartes and developed to a peak by Rousseau. Descartes came up with the 
idea that perfect institutions can only be established by a wise legislator. This faith in 
man’s ability to deliberately design social institutions serving the advancement of 
human civilization led to the social contract theory in the 18th century. False 
individualism is also related to the general idea of the French social contract tradition 
that man receives his natural rights through this social contract from the state and that 
there are no natural rights in the state of nature (different than the Scottish/British social 
contract theory). Hayek calls false individualism rationalistic not because it assumes 
that the individual behaves rational but because the philosophers claim that it is possible 
to design social institutions by the pure application of human intellect. It is the proper 
implementation of these designed institutions that guarantee freedom and the 
flourishing of the individual. Small groups like the family or voluntarily associations 
shall be dissolved into atoms and be substituted with the cohesion by coercive rules 
substituted by the state. 
 
True Individualism 
The main alternative today is called true individualism by Hayek and associated largely 
with the Scottish thinkers of Enlightenment. They have a different concept of the social 
contract and of community in general. In this school of thought, the individual has 
certain unalienable rights that are reflected in social institutions (like private property) 
and in order to secure these essential human rights men render some of their freedoms 
to the state and enter a social contract. But though there is a social contract and thus a 
state existing, this cannot be the object of investigation of social sciences. Hayek points 
out that “there is no other way toward an understanding of social phenomena but 
through our understanding of individual actions directed to other people and guided by 
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their expected behavior”171. True individualism recognizes the institutions and 
establishments that have emerged without human design and are now the foundations 
for future human achievements. It is a concept that emphasizes the limits of human 
reason and shows a great humility in regard to social and economic processes. These 
spontaneous collaborations of free men can produce outcomes that surpass their 
individual imagination and knowledge. It is this highly anti-rationalistic approach of 
English individualism that regards man as an irrational and fallible being and 
distinguishes it from other traditions of individualism. 
 
Since true individualism is not established by the coercive power of the state but is 
given by nature it is also not opposed to natural forms of community and associations 
such as the family or local autonomies. Hayek mentions that therefore true 
individualism is less individualistic than socialism.  
 
Methodological Individualism 
Hayek outlines his arguments for methodological individualism in his essay “Scientism 
ant the Study of Society.” There he distinguishes social sciences clearly from natural 
sciences. While natural sciences can discover objective facts, the data of social science 
always have to be interpreted with systematic subjectivism. He argues that these facts 
are themselves ideas or concepts. He follows his teacher Ludwig von Mises in this 
consistent application of subjectivism to social science. An important fact related to 
subjectivism is the arising epistemological problem, which is one of Hayek’s main 
contributions to economics.172 Since knowledge is dispersed, incomplete and 
inconsistent, the use of quantitative analysis in social science is impossible and leads to 
constant errors. Hayek describes the method of natural sciences as analytic and the 
method of social sciences as compositive or synthetic.173  
 
 
 
                                                 
171 Hayek, “Individualism: True and False”, 1948, p.6 
172 cf. Friedrich A. Hayek, “The Use of Knowledge in Society”, in The American Economic Review 1945, 
pp. 519-530 
173 cf. Friedrich A. Hayek, “Scientism and the Study of Society”, in Economia 1942,  p. 287 
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Self-Love 
Hayek rejects the common assumption that it is possible to derive the idea of the 
economic man from methodological or true individualism especially in the philosophy 
of Adam Smith and his contemporaries. Hayek points out that the concept of human 
nature of that time was not that of a rationalist, utility-maximizing individual but rather 
that humans are by nature lazy, improvident and wasteful and behave economically only 
by the force of the circumstances. The terms self-love or selfish interest were considered 
as the universal moving principles in 18th century philosophy. They did not mean profit-
maximization but rather expressed a moral attitude. Hayek points out that the self, as a 
matter of fact, includes friends and family. Even more important than this moral attitude 
is again the epistemological fact that the individual cannot know more than a tiny part 
of society and therefore it is quite impossible to judge human action as selfish. So the 
questions is not so much whether we should allow man to be guided by selfish motives. 
We should rather ask if he is capable of acting guided by the knowledge of the 
immediate consequences of his actions or whether someone else who possesses a fuller 
comprehension of this knowledge is better equipped to make the decision for him. From 
this distinction and argumentation Hayek also derives his critique of government 
interference and his justification for free markets. 
 
5.4 Individualism & Entrepreneurship 
Methodological individualism might be a reasonable concept for approaching 
economics on a macro-level. It helps to understand some of the ways how individuals 
act and how these actions can be classified and scientifically considered. Nevertheless, 
there are some problems arising especially if we turn to the micro-level of economics. 
As we have observed in our assessment of entrepreneurial activity, it seems that we can 
distinguish between different kinds of actions. In particular, actions that are performed 
under a condition of true uncertainty cannot be considered as being rational in the 
ordinary meaning of this concept. A response to true uncertainty requires two 
conditions: (1) a low inter-subjective agreement to the profit opportunity and (2) a 
person with a high degree of venturesomeness who has qualities of leadership in the 
economic sphere and becomes a bearer of uncertainty. Additionally methodological 
individualism is only focusing on individual actions. Earlier, we discovered that 
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entrepreneurship can only be identified by a series of actions that are related to each 
other and that those actions can be characterized as entrepreneurial only after they have 
been actually performed. 
 
These facts reveal some of the shortcomings of the anthropological concept of 
methodological individualism. Addtionally, the concept is not consistently used by 
those economists who claim that they build their theoretical framework on this 
assumption. The phrase is also misleading because it is frequently interpreted as a kind 
of atomism on the one hand and on the other hand as rationalist individualism that 
affirms a distinguished role of the human mind superior to the coordinative functions of 
sound institutions and free competition. It also connotes an understanding of human 
actions that gives way to the approach of econometrics – human actions that can be 
statistically assessed and, by creating models under simplified conditions, can enable 
the economists to virtually predict the future state of affairs. 
 
Generally, we can see that these anthropological arguments of the economists we have 
looked at shall support some of their economic arguments. In particular the quantitative 
approach to economics shall be rejected by this notion. However, the term 
methododological individualism is misleading as already mentioned. The concept of the 
individual, especially in its atomistic variant, cannot prevent its misuse in an 
econometric approach. It does not emphasize enough the uniqueness of the individual 
but concedes an understanding of the individual that can be grouped in order to be 
quantified. 
 
Therefore, we want to look at the anthropological concept of personalism and apply it to 
the economic sphere. As already outlined, personalism is rooted in philosophical 
anthropology and refuses any kind of a quantitative approach to the human person. Its 
focus on human action as the main expression of the human person in the world is a 
sound basis for the approach to economics and especially to entrepreneurship as 
outlined above. 
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6. Economic Personalism 
 
Though personalism did not emerge as a term until the second half of the 20th century, it 
is rooted in a general reaction to rationalism, pantheism and absolute idealism that 
occurred throughout the 19th century. There are many schools of thoughts that dedicated 
themselves to a personalist approach in philosophy. One of the earliest purely 
philosophical definitions of the person was given by Boethius: “persona est naturae 
rationalis individual substantia” (the person is an individual substance of a rational 
nature). This general definition is still valid for many personalists today and serves as a 
starting point for further exploration in the different disciplines of science. 
 
Though there are differences between the various personalist schools, the Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy identifies some common principles that are more or less 
shared by all of them: “These include an insistence on the radical difference between 
persons and non-persons and on the irreducibility of the person to impersonal spiritual 
or material factors, an affirmation of the dignity of persons, a concern for the person’s 
subjectivity and self-determination, and particular emphasis on the social (relational) 
nature of the person.”174 
 
The foundations for this understanding of the person have already been laid and have 
been outlined above in the philosophical anthropology. Even though Max Scheler, 
Arnold Gehlen und Helmuth Plessner did not particularly emphasize “the person” in the 
center of their investigation, their assessment of human nature and principles that should 
serve as arguments for the uniqueness of the human person have already prepared the 
philosophical ground for the rise of the personal understanding of human nature that 
specifically relates to human action. 
 
Personalist Principles 
Personalists consider only the person with his/her subjectivity as “somebody” 
ontologically different from all other objects that are merely “something.” This 
                                                 
174 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Personalism, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/personalism, 
visited March 3rd 2010  
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subjectivity of the human person is on the one hand a starting point for all philosophical 
and scientific investigation and on the other hand it serves as the main argument for the 
irreducibility of man. 
 
This radical dichotomy of persons and non-persons is also fundamental for the concept 
of the dignity of the person. Kant expresses it in the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of 
Morals with his notion that a person shall act in such a way that humanity, whether in 
your own person or in the person of any other, is always treated as an end and never 
merely as a means to an end.175 This implies for a personalist that fundamentally 
different standards have to be applied for persons compared to the material world and to 
other forms of being. This is a rejection of any kind of collectivist, materialist, idealist 
or utilitarian philosophy. Only a person possesses subjectivity and is therefore the only 
entity that has the capacity for imagination, creativity and action. 
 
Though a person is always related with other persons and can experience his own 
personhood only through sympathy and empathy for other persons, this does not mean 
that the acting person is determined by these relations or by society as a whole. 
Subjectivity helps to distinguish personalism from individualism. The concept of the 
uniqueness and irreplaceability of the person does not allow a treatment like that of the 
individual who can be used as a representation of a single unit in a homogenous set.176 
 
Another important aspect of personalism is self-determination. From the perception of 
an “I,” the human person is able to act not in a mechanically determined way but by 
expressing his free will. This inalienable power of self-mastery is very important for the 
analysis of dispersed knowledge in society that we did earlier. There is no way to 
substitute the act of a person for the free will of another and this fact has far reaching 
implications on the discussion of whether a society can be centrally planned or not. The 
free act of a person is essential to human nature. We can distinguish between so-called 
“acts of man” (actus homini) and “human acts” (actus humani). The former describes 
the appearing phenomena caused by the latter. To understand the acts of man one must 
study human acts. These human acts are not only directed towards a particular value but 
                                                 
175 Immanuel Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Moral, Indianapolis 1993, p. 30 
176 Therefore the human person is not eligible for any sort of statistical assessment. 
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they also determine the actor. Due to his ability qua person to distinguish between good 
and evil, the acting person makes himself a morally good or bad human being by 
carrying out certain actions. The person is not only responsible for his actions but also 
for himself. 
 
Communion and its importance is another important distinction between personalism 
and individualism. A person cannot exist without communion. Therefore, one can 
derive a natural order among the different forms of community in which a person is 
acting. While for individualism all forms of communion are equal and ontologically 
secondary to the individual, the person qua person is always already in community with 
others. He is born into the natural community of the family and joins voluntarily 
different forms of associations (church, corporations, neighborhood and other groups 
and communities). He is always part of different entities with overlapping legal and 
executive powers that provide a framework (usually addressed as “the state”) for the 
ontologically prior communities as well as interact and interfere with them. 
 
6.1 History of Personalism 
The history of philosophy has brought about three main centers of personalism that are 
important to our investigations.177 (1) French personalism was a movement started by 
Emanuel Monier in the 1930s. It was largely a reaction to the economic collapse and the 
political and moral disorientation of this time. (2) German personalism was closely 
related to phenomenology developed by Edmund Husserl and was focused on the 
opposition to German idealism. It wanted to overcome the Kantian dichotomy of 
noumena and phenomena and correct the errors of positivism and nominalism. (3) 
Polish personalism was centered around the Catholic University of Lublin and Karol 
Wojtyla, who studied Max Scheler (a student of Husserl), and created a personalist 
synthesis of his Aristotelian-Thomistic formation and Scheler’s phenomenology. 
 
French Personalism 
French Personalism is primarly associated with two names: Emanuel Mounier and 
Gabriel Marcel. Mounier, who was a professor in philosophy, started a journal called 
                                                 
177 cf. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Personalism, Chap. 2 
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Esprit in the 1930s. After it was suppressed during World War II, it became one of the 
most influential journals in France. Mounier’s approach was not to give definitive 
solutions but rather to raise the right questions. As he wrote in 1952, shortly before his 
death, personalism is a “certain outlook on human problems […] to accenture certain 
demands which do not always receive sufficient consideration in proposed solutions for 
our present crisis.”178 
 
Central to Mounier’s personalism was the freedom and creativity of persons and also 
the impossibility to define a person. The subjectivity of an other is a mystery that is not 
available either to be defined with words or with numbers. Monier points out that the 
concept of the person was not fully appreciated in the history of philosophy. The Greek 
worldview, which was more concerned with the cosmos, also dominated the Roman era. 
With the rise of Christianity and Christian theology the focus was shifted more towards 
a personal perspective, though the scholastics still cared more about the non-personal 
being. Mounier’s philosophy can also be understood as “a reaction against the excess of 
the philosophy of ideas and the philosophy of things”179. This reaction was especially 
directed towards communism and nationalism and he was an opponent of any kind of 
philosophy that did not recognize the human person as a core aspect in society. 
 
Gabriel Marcel was another French philosopher of the person. His approach to 
philosophy is unsystematic like Mounier’s and rejects the ideas of Hegel and any other 
kind of primarily abstract philosophy. Marcel coined the phrase “functionalization of 
man” meaning that man appears to himself and others only as a conglomerate of 
functions. The result is that we no longer speak about man the mystery but about the 
functions of a man as producer, parent or churchgoer. Now we can analyze man in his 
function while man as a mystery would fall outside the scope of human intellect. 
 
                                                 
178 Patricia Donohue-White/ Stephen J. Grabill/ Christopher Westley/ Gloria Zúñiga: Human Nature and 
the Discipline of Economics: Personalist Anthropology and Economic Methodolog, Oxford, Lanham 
2002, p. 31 
179 Donohue-White et al. Human Nature and the Discipline of Economics, 2002, p. 33 
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In summary, in the French tradition of personalism we can clearly observe the persistent 
avoidance of reductionism. The philosophers were opposed to the 20th-century 
tendencies of narrowing human existence down to a single aspect of investigation. 
 
German Personalism 
German personalism was heavily influenced by Edmund Husserl and his 
phenomenology, which is more a methodological approach to philosophy than a 
comprehensive doctrine. This method follows the claim, “back to the thing” and was 
applied to personalism by two German philosophers: Max Scheler and Martin Buber. 
 
Max Scheler developed a variant theory that can be called value-personalism – he gives 
concrete status to abstract values. These values are not rational formal standards like the 
Kantians but possessed material content that becomes immediately known to the 
individual through a process of intuition.180 
 
Martin Buber focused more attention on the person and his relationship to others in 
community. He argued against individualism that sees man only in relationship with 
himself as well as collectivism, which reduces man to a part of an organic whole. His 
central claim is the importance of I-Thou-relationships distinguished from I-it 
relationships. The first can be called personal the latter functional. The totality of the I-
Thou-relationships forms the solidarity of the community. 
 
German personalism is more concerned with the relationships of persons with others 
and locates itself as a medium between individualism and collectivism. It had strong 
influence on a third European center of personalism: the polish variant. 
 
Polish personalism 
The central thinker in Polish personalism is Karol Wojtyla, later Pope John Paul II. He 
wrote his dissertation on Max Scheler’s view on morality and man. Wojtyla discovered 
phenomenology in Scheler’s writing that helped him to develop his anthropology from 
his Thomist understanding of a static rational substance to that of an acting man. 
                                                 
180 cf. Donohue-White et al. Human Nature and the Discipline of Economics, 2002, p. 35 
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Wojtyla used personalism to inform catholic theology and was responsible, especially 
as Pope, for the spread of personalist ideas among Catholic theologians. 
 
His main book on personalism is The Acting Person, which was written in 1969 and 
eventually translated into English in 1979. One of his hallmarks in this book is the 
Aristotelian-Thomistic approach to human action and community. He is convinced that 
the potential to participate in community is a part of the self. This potential has to be 
activated to mature. Though the self-determined human person is free to act but needs 
not to act, it is still necessary to act jointly with others in order to realize one’s own 
potential and to advance to a higher level of the self. Wojtyla describes three 
characteristics of the acting person181: (1) self-possession means to be the seat of one’s 
actions; (2) self-governance is the ability to make life-forming decisions regarding 
vocation, marriage and also in regards to religion; and (3) self-determination is the 
ability to determine one’s own actions as an expression of the self and also as a 
formation of the self. 
 
6.2 Economic Personalism 
After this assessment of personalism in its broad philosophical tradition we turn now to 
an application of these personalist principles to economics. The phrase Economic 
Personalism was first used in 1996 by Gregory Gronbacher, who was a fellow at the 
Acton Institute for the study of religion and liberty. The ideas promoted by the Acton 
Institute are deeply rooted in Catholic social teaching, especially in the tradition of Pope 
John Paul II. In economic terms, the institute is dedicated to the Austrian School of 
Economics. The mission of the institute is to build a synthesis of Christian moral 
principles applied to a specific approach to economics. 
 
The idea of Economic Personalism was outlined in a three volume series by the Acton 
Institute in 2001 and was followed by a debate in the Institute’s journal “Markets and 
Morality.” The aim of this project was to initiate an interdisciplinary debate between 
theologians, philosophers and economists on the underlying anthropological 
                                                 
181 cf. Anthony J. Santelli, Jr./Jeffrey Sikkenga/Rev. Robert A. Sirico/Steven Yates/Gloria Zúñiga, The 
Free Person and the Free Economy: A Personalist View of Market Economics, Oxford 2002, p. 50 et 
seqq. 
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assumptions of modern economic theory and their philosophical and theological 
applications. 
 
If we apply personalism to the discipline of economics we have to ask again: What is 
the human person? As we stated earlier, Boethius considered a rational nature of an 
individual substance as essential to the definition of person. Since economics is the 
science of human action we could speak about the expression of this rational human 
nature in human acts. We face of course some problems in defining a person by his 
rational acts. In a personalist approach, we do not only focus on human acts but also on 
the actor. An actor – a person – is constantly a person and not only in the situation of 
action and this implies that the potential for rational action is sufficient for defining a 
person in economic theory. With this distinction of potential and actual rational action 
we can also justify the personhood of an unborn baby and mentally ill persons. There 
are several other epistemic shortcomings in regard to the person, especially in the 
question of how to recognize someone as a person, but to advance in the topic we will 
now focus on the ontological examination of Economic Personalism. 
 
We will follow in this analysis Gloria L. Zúñiga who pointed out some of the epistemic 
and ontological problems of personalism in her paper, What is Economic Personalism?, 
and proposed the following definition for personalism: “an ontological structure in 
which reality is fundamentally personal.”182 This means that no mediate relations 
between nonperson objects and persons exist. All higher-order economic goods that 
might suggest the existence of such relations have been transformed by human action to 
this higher form of good. But the integration of personalism into economics does not 
produce a new economic methodology because economics is concerned with human 
action and human choice and therefore already personalist in nature. But personalism 
can correct some shortcomings in the existing theories. 
 
Mainstream neoclassical economics have built their theoretical assumptions on the 
grounds of economic efficiency that are rooted in Paretto optimacy, which again is 
heavily influenced by Benthamian utilitarianism. The problem in regard to the person is 
                                                 
182 Gloria Zúñiga, “What is Economic Personalism? A Phenomenological Analysis”, in Journal of 
Markets & Morality, 2001, p. 160 
  99 
that there is no moral limitation on the ends that individuals seek to achieve. According 
to the utilitarian principle, the greatest happiness of the greatest number is the main 
target of economic and social processes. The moral problems arising are obvious 
because this can easily lead to totalitarianism in many forms.183 
 
Also, the Austrian school of economics has shortcomings in considering certain 
implications of human action since it excludes the relevance of these implications by 
definition. Though the Austrians, due to their non-mathematical approach to economics, 
did not have to adopt the utilitarian principle, they still face difficulties with moral 
values that could be solved with the theory of Economic Personalism. 
 
The final question of course is what Economic Personalism really means. The formal 
properties are outlined by Zúñiga184: (1) Economic Personalism is a conduct that is 
absolute person-mindedness, (2) a conduct considered not only as action but also as 
thinking, judging and choosing (3) a personalist approach to things and state of affairs, 
(4) a conduct, thing and real state of affairs must occur in economic environment that 
involves a state of scarcity and gives rise to a choice that results in costs, (5) and a 
certain quality in person-mindedness. In conclusion, she defines Economic Personalism 
as “an object with three properties: a bearer, an economic content, and a unifying 
quality called person-mindedness [in] short we can say simply that economic 
personalism is economic agency or economic objects connected to human meaning and 
concern.”185 
 
6.3 Economic Personalism & Methodological Individualism 
After this assessment of Methodological Individualism and Economic Personalism we 
want to answer now the question of how they are related and what personalism could 
contribute to economic methodology. 
 
Economic Personalism is above all an important ally in the rejection of a phenomenon 
that is called economic imperialism or economism. This means the application of the 
                                                 
183 We do not investigate these problems in depth here. 
184 cf. Zúñiga, “What is Economic Personalism? A Phenomenological Analysis”, 2001, p. 169f 
185 Zúñiga, “What is Economic Personalism? A Phenomenological Analysis”, 2001, p. 170f 
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rational choice praxeology to all human behavior. Methodological individualism was 
invented as a concept in reaction to collectivist approaches to human action, especially 
during the Methodenstreit. It distinguishes its methodology with a primary focus on 
human action or behavior as the source for economic analysis; it also emphasizes that 
human acts are always acts of the individual person. Nevertheless, this concept is 
misleading and has some shortcomings as was pointed out. We can also observe that 
those economists who applied this anthropological concept over time moved away from 
their initial assumption. For example, Schumpeter applied individualism in the way that 
he turned to econometrics and Hayek shifted towards evolutionism. 
 
It might therefore be more appropriate and less misleading to employ personalism as the 
anthropological foundation for any kind of economic thought that rejects all sorts of 
reductionism and economism. Personalism is by definition opposed to atomism and puts 
the acting person and his/her relationship to his/her environment and to society in the 
center of interest. Even though at the time when methodological individualism was 
developed there was still a different understanding of the individual and the self 
common, things have changed. The concept of individualism is dominated by an 
understanding that reaches even further than Tocqueville’s. It is a very misanthropic 
approach to life and society that tries to avoid any contact with other persons. 
 
Our whole discussion presupposes a natural tendency of the individual towards society 
and other people. In order to avoid misunderstandings and to be able to develop a 
thorough and comprehensive philosophical framework for economics, it is therefore 
more appropriate to use economic personalism as the anthropological foundation for 
economic theory rather than methodological individualism. 
 
6.4 Economic Personalism & Entrepreneurship 
This is especially valid when it comes to the assessment of entrepreneurship. We have 
already observed that for the advocates of methodological individualism, true 
entrepreneurship is not really fitting in their theoretical framework. Mises calls true 
entrepreneurs “promoters” and finds no place for them in his very logical system of 
praxeology. There are many different motivations for promoters to actually start an 
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enterprise. If we only look at the single human action, we cannot understand what 
entrepreneurship really is. In our assessment we also have pointed out that 
entrepreneurial activity in the economy has a different ontological level than other 
activities. With Knight we understood that the entrepreneur becomes a bearer of 
uncertainty. This is due to the fact that time is not a physical but an anthropological 
phenomenon. Only man has time and only man can be aware that his future is uncertain. 
Unlike other living beings that react to signals of their environment, human beings do 
not respond instinctively but act with purpose. Purpose has its meaning only by the 
uncertainty of the future. Within the economy this purposeful action as entrepreneurial 
action is important in several ways. These ways cannot be considered if the ontological 
status of all human actions in the economy is the same. 
 
Entrepreneurship as uncertainty-bearing has an equilibrating impact on the economy. 
Entrepreneurship requires forecast of the future and the carrying out of this plan. This 
involves several actions which, viewed separately, cannot be understood as 
entrepreneurial acts. Forecast, judgment and execution is the triple that distinguishes 
entrepreneurial acts from other actions. With personalism we can also understand better 
the social aspects of an enterprise. With the firm the entrepreneur can offer guarantees 
to his employees and use his self-confidence to shoulder uncertainty away. This is also 
contributing to the stability of a society. 
 
With these insights we can finally conclude that the more persons within a society who 
carry out entrepreneurial actions, the more the economy is pushed towards equilibrium, 
the smaller the entrepreneurial profit will be and the more stable society will be. These 
are insights that can only be generated with a specific personalist approach to economy. 
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7. Conclusion 
 
We want to conclude briefly in this last chapter what we have discovered in this 
investigation of entrepreneurship and its anthropological foundations. From the 
philosophical assessment of the human being, we have derived the following principles: 
(1) action is a particular human category and essential for human nature and the concept 
of the person; (2) man is a deficient being and is urged to act in order to survive; and (3) 
man’s actions transform the natural reality and create an artificial culture. 
 
Additionally, human acts in the economy are driven particularly by uncertainty. We 
developed the following arguments for uncertainty about the future: (1) uncertainty 
motivates human action and humans act in order to reduce uneasiness, (2) knowledge is 
dispersed among people and is best applied by acts of the individual, (3) to bear the 
uncertainty of the future man has to make judgment, believe in them and carry them out. 
 
With these preconditions of human nature we explored the nature of entrepreneurship – 
human acts within a market motivated by the uncertainty of the future. These acts 
require some sort of alertness to hitherto unnoticed profit opportunities, at least partially 
ownership of the employed resources and some sort managerial qualities. By 
forecasting the uncertain future, developing a plan, and carrying out this plan, the 
entrepreneur becomes a bearer of uncertainty. We discussed different arguments for the 
existence of profit. While the entrepreneurial income cannot really be determined by the 
different functions an entrepreneur performs, his function as uncertainty-bearer is the 
ultimate justification for receiving the residual income or suffering the residual loss. As 
bearer of uncertainty he acts equilibrating within the economy, reduces uneasiness and 
creates new opportunities for himself and other entrepreneurs. He needs the firm to 
exploit his opportunities and the firm is the mean through which entrepreneurship can 
be carried out over time. 
 
This complex reality of actions, community and motivations provided the basis for our 
critique of the anthropological concept of methodological individualism - the basis for 
most of the economists we have discussed. It was designed in order to remove the 
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person form any kind of mathematical assessment. The reality of human action is too 
complex to be designed in macro-economic models. As we have pointed out the concept 
of economic personalism provides a better theoretical framework to achieve this goal 
because it stresses in a better way the fundamental uniqueness of the human person. 
 
This assessment of entrepreneurship and its anthropological foundations was 
particularly intended to reconnect economic theory with its philosophical origin. 
Economists sometimes can lose sight of the big picture if they go too much into detail. 
The philosopher usually draws a greater picture and does not shy away from employing 
terms and concepts that might not have a immediate application for economic theory but 
help a person to understand the basic principles on which the debate is built on. 
 
Ethics and morality are often delegated by economists to the science of business 
administration. Many economists believe that the only thing they have to do is to 
observe human actions and to derive principles from these observations. At first sight 
this involves no ethics. But intentions are not neutral – they have a moral quality and 
therefore we have to consider them. The economists of the Austrian school of 
economics, we have discussed above, often neglect this reality. Only if we look at the 
human being as a dignified, relational person rather than as an autonomous individual 
we can understand the implications thereof. There are human actions that do not 
contribute to human flourishing. Even if they are monetary profitable, they can destroy 
human relationships or even human lives. Therefore, it is not sufficient to provide a 
framework for society that enables man to act freely; we also have to be concerned to 
provide a framework that promotes action towards the moral good. 
 
One example in regard to entrepreneurship is the difference between constructive and 
destructive entrepreneurship. While our investigations were primarily concerned with 
the metaphysical and anthropological dimensions of entrepreneurship, this would be an 
application to ethics and political philosophy. Let’s think back to the story of Thales at 
the beginning. Let’s assume now that Thales is not the inventor of a new technology but 
that he has contracted the best workers for pressing olives by human labor. If someone 
else would invent mechanical presses this would do a huge damage to his business. So 
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he influences his friends in politics in order to create a new law that would prohibit the 
use of any technology to press olives. This can of course also be considered as some 
sort of an entrepreneurial act. But in this case the advancement of society and the 
economy has been prohibited due to this rent-seeking attitude of Thales. Destructive 
entrepreneurship is not only related to the question of governmental interference. 
Entrepreneurship might also be destructive for the human person. From a perspective of 
the individual who is only characterized by his actions, we cannot understand the 
impacts of such actions. 
 
But if we look at the morality of the acting individual as a person, we can see that a 
person is a structural order of acts. A person can determine his acts, has the ability to act 
contrary to his drives and instincts and is always in communion. His acts have moral 
implications on himself and on the world around him. 
 
Although this paper outlined the positive aspects of constructive entrepreneurship, 
which function entrepreneurship has in the economy, and how it contributes to human 
flourishing and to the advancement of society, we want to remark at the end that this is 
not valid for entrepreneurship per se. To understand the moral implications of 
entrepreneurship, we have to develop a thorough understanding of the human person. 
This would require a more thorough assessment of the morality of entrepreneurship as a 
whole that could be carried out in a future project. 
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Abstract 
 
English 
This thesis defends economic personalism as the sufficient anthropological basis for 
understanding entrepreneurship. It is separated into three main chapters. The first 
chapter explores the motivations for human action, particularly within the tradition of 
the philosophical anthropology. The issue of uncertainty about the future is a central 
aspect that is analyzed in depth. The main actor in the economy, who is acting as bearer 
of uncertainty, is the entrepreneur. With the next step, the different aspects of 
entrepreneurial activity are contrasted with each other: the alertness for hitherto 
unnoticed profit opportunities, the importance of ownership and the ability to forecast 
the future and to turn these plans into reality. These concepts are reflected along the 
general guideline of Aristotle’s ethics and metaphysics. The investigation of the 
function of the entrepreneur within the enterprise completes this discussion and leads to 
the confrontation of the anthropological concepts of methodological individualism and 
economic personalism. Currently, the tradition of economic personalism is more useful 
to remove the individual from macroeconomic utilization of mathematical models. 
Furthermore, entrepreneurial activity reveals the tight limits of methodological 
individualism that are not able to fully recognize the broadness of the concept of the 
entrepreneur. 
 
 
Deutsch 
Die Arbeit unterteilt sich in drei Abschnitte. Zuerst werden die Motivationen für 
menschliches Handeln vor allem in der philosophischen Anthropologie untersucht. Das 
Thema der Ungewissheit über die Zukunft stellt sich vor allem für wirtschaftliches 
Handeln als ein zentraler Aspekt heraus und wird daher genauer analysiert. Der 
Hauptakteur in der Volkswirtschaft, der als Träger dieser Ungewissheit agiert, ist der 
Unternehmer. Von der Aufmerksamkeit für nicht genutzte Profitmöglichkeiten über die 
Wichtigkeit von Eigentum und dem Einsatz dessen bis hin zur Urteilskraft und der 
Fähigkeit in die Zukunft vorauszuplanen und diese Pläne auch zu verwirklichen werden 
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die unterschiedlichen Aspekte unternehmerischer Tätigkeit gegenübergestellt und 
anhand der generellen Leitlinie der Aristotelischen Ethik und Metaphysik reflektiert. 
Die Untersuchung der Funktion des Unternehmers in einem Unternehmen rundet diese 
Auseinandersetzung ab und leitet über zu einer Gegenüberstellung der 
anthropologischen Grundkonzeptionen des methodologischen Individualismus und des 
ökonomischen Personalismus. Es stellt sich heraus, dass sich die Tradition des 
ökonomischen Personalismus heute als anthropologische Grundlage besser eignet, um 
das Individuum einer makroökonomischen Verwertung durch mathematische Modelle 
zu entziehen. Gerade im Bezug auf die unternehmerische Tätigkeit werden zudem die 
engen anthropologischen Grenzen des methodologischen Individualismus aufgezeigt, 
der die Breite des Unternehmerbegriffes nicht vollständig erfassen kann. 
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